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STEMMING THE TIDE: UNIFORMI1Y IN ADMIRAL1Y 
COMMANDS NO RECOVERY FOR RECREATIONAL VESSEL 
LOSSES UNDER A MARINE PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y THEORY 
IN MARYLAND COURTS DUE TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS 
RULE OF EAST RIVER STEAMSHIP CORP. v. TRANSAMERlCA 
DELAVAL, INC. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Chesapeake Bay and Maryland's nearby seacoast provide 
marvelous recreational opportunities for avid sailors regardless of 
whether wind or engine power propels their boats. However, an ex-
hilarating day on the water can become dangerous if the vessel or 
its equipment is defective. During 1996, 197 boating accidents I re-
portedly2 occurred on Maryland's territorial waters.3 These accidents 
1. See See U.S. Dep't of Transp., U.S. Coa~t Guard, Boating Statistics-1996 at 26 
(1996). 
2. See id. at 7. The operator of a recreational vessel must file a Boat.ing Accident 
Report if the craft is involved in an accident that results in loss of lite, per-
sonal injury requiring medical treatment beyond first aid, property damage in 
excess of $500 (including the complete loss of the vessel), or the disappear-
ance of a person from the vessel if the circumstances indicate death or injury. 
Se,e 46 U.S.C. § 6101 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 173.55 (1998). Maryland's accident-re-
porting requirements are virtually identical to the federal guidelines. See MD. 
CoDE ANN., NAT. REs. II § 8-724(b) (Supp. 1997). Nationwide, "[t]he Coast 
Guard received reports for a total of 8,026 recreational boating accident~ in 
1996; the most ever reported." U.S. DEI,'T OF TRANSI'., supra note I, at 4 (Ex-
ecutive Summal),). Also, in 1996, the Coast Guard reported that a total of 709 
fatalities, a record high of 4,442 personal injuries, and property damage of 
$22,829,958 occurred during recreational vessel activities nationwide. ,y,e id. at 
4,24. 
3. Se,e MD. ('.oDE ANN., NAT. REs. II § 8-101 (g) (1-5) (1997). Under state law, Mary-
land territorial waters are: 
Both surface and underground waters within the boundaries of the 
State subject to it., jurisdiction[,] ... [t]hat portion of the Atlantic 
Ocean within the boundaries of the State[,] ... [t]he Chesapeake 
Bay and it., tributaries . . . [a] II ponds, lakes, rivers [within the 
boundaries of the State] ... and [t]he floodplain of all free-flowing 
waters determined by the Department of Environment. 
.ld.; see al~o id. § 8-701 (r) (defining state waters for the purposes of the State 
Boat Act a., "any' water within the jurisdiction of the State, [and] the marginal 
sea a~jacent to the State"). Maryland ha~ not been alone in attempting to de-
fine "territorial waters." See, e.g., United States v. One Big Six Wheel, 987 F. 
Supp. 169, 176-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In On,e Big Six Whee~ the United States Dis-
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resulted in nineteen fatalities4 and serious injuries5 to 109 persons.6 
Boating accidents can also result in a constructive total loss7 or com-
plete loss of the vessels involved.8 In 1996, boating accidents re-
sulted in property damage worth $794,691 on Maryland waters 
alone.9 
The United States Coast Guard attributes many boating acci-
dents to defective recreational vessels' hulls, \0 machinery failures, or 
equipment failures. II Defects in the recreational vessel's control sys-
tem!2 or component parts!3 causing personal injury or damage to 
property give rise to a marine products liability cause of action.!4 No 
matter whether an admiralty action over a defective marine product 
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that territorial wa-
ters include " 'those waters within the international boundary line ... or 
within 3 nautical miles (3.45 statute miles) from low tide on the coastline.' " 
Id. at 172 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 43.4472-1 (1997». Yet, state attempts to define 
territorial waters is of limited utility in admiralty law; only an Act of Congress 
or federal court may determine questions of admiralty tort jurisdiction. See in-
fra notes 171, 185, and 191 and accompanying text; see also Puget Sound 
Power & Light Co. v. Federal Regulatory Energy Comm'n, 644 F.2d 785, 788 
(9th Cir. 1981) (noting that "state law is not determinative of navigability"). 
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 26. 
5. Serious injuries are those that require medical treatment beyond first aid. See 
supra note 2. 
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 26. 
7. In the maritime context, a constructive total loss occurs when recovery of the 
vessel is unlikely if sunken or destroyed, the expense of recovery of the vessel 
exceeds the vessel's valuation after recovery, or the cost of repairs would ex-
ceed the value of the vessel after repairs. See 1 ALEx L. PARKS, THE LAw AND 
PRACTICE OF MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE 441 (1987). 
8. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 24. 
9. See id. at 26. 
10. See id. at 32. In 1996, recreational vessel hull failures were identified as a cause 
in 80 accidents that resulted in nine fatalities. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. See Bodnar v. Hi-Lex Corp., 919 F. Supp. 1234, 1235 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (address-
ing a products liability claim under admiralty law for a design defect in the 
throttle control system of a pleasure boat). 
13. See O'Hara v. Bayliner, 679 N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (N.Y. 1997) (addressing a per-
sonal injury claim arising from an allegedly defectively designed cleat on a 
water-ski boat). 
14. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 
(1986) ("The paradigmatic products-liability action is one where a product 
'reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril,' distributed without rein-
spection, causes bodily injury." (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III 
N.E. 1050, 1051, 1053 (N.Y. 1916»). 
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is brought in federaps or state court,16 the claim should be gov-
erned by the substantive maritime law l7-an area of law where liti-
gants are given an ample opportunity to recover for their bodily in-
juries and property damages. 18 
Occasionally, a dispute arises where the purportedly defective 
product caused purely economic losses-without personal injury or 
damage to property other than the vessel. 19 The substantive mari-
15. See infra Part III.A. 
16. See infra Part III.B. 
17. See infra Part III.C. The substantive maritime law is part of the federal, not 
state, common law. See O'Hara, 679 N.E.2d at 1054. As observed by New York's 
court of appeals in O'Hara, the Supreme Court has noted that: 
although State courts are authorized to entertain maritime causes of 
action, "the 'extent to which state law may be used to remedy mari-
time injuries is constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which 
requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform 
to governing federal maritime standards." 
Id. (quoting Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1972), super-
seded by statute as stated in Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993); see 
also Peter Thompson, State Courts and State Law: A New Force in Admiralty?, 8 
U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 223, 230 (1996). But cf. Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938) (holding that in a case in federal court sitting in diversity, the substan-
tive law of the forum state is applicable). 
The reverse-Erie doctrine is one of several approaches commonly used to 
determine whether federal maritime law preempts state law. See Thompson, 
supra, at 266. This doctrine effectively erases the influence of State law; as ob-
served by one commentator: "Applying 'reverse-Erie,' state courts hearing a 
maritime case are obligated to follow a federal maritime rule of decision just 
as federal courts in diversity cases are obligated to apply the relevant rule of 
decision of the forum state." Id. But see Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 
593 So. 2d 634, 636, 644 (La. 1992) (holding that predominately local interests 
and lack of contrary applicable federal legislation mandated application of 
state law instead of general maritime law). 
18. A plaintiff may choose to bring a tort claim under the general maritime law, 
rather than under state law because the availability of comparative negligence. 
Compare, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 407 (1975) 
(discussing the general acceptance of comparative negligence in admiralty), 
with, e.g., Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 446-58, 
456 A.2d 894, 895-900 (1983) (comparing comparative and contributory negli-
gence and refusing to disturb the well-established place of contributory negli-
gence in Maryland law). Whereas a plaintiff may be precluded from recovery 
altogether under Maryland law, the general maritime law leaves the door 
open to tort recovery even for the negligent plaintiff. 
19. See Reeder R Fox & Patrick]. Loftus, RUling the Chc;ppy Waters of East River: Ec-
onomic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 263-64 (1997) ("Eco-
nomic loss has been defined as 'loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and 
lost profits' ") (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
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time law forbids any recovery unless there are personal injuries or 
property damage other than to the vessel itself;20 therefore, no court 
may award purely economic damages for a maritime claim.21 This 
principle is known as the East River doctrine,22 named for the Su-
preme Court decision adding this rule to the substantive maritime 
law23 or "admiralty" as it is also known.24 
This Comment will focus on the complex procedural path to 
judgment25 in courts applying admiralty law and the restrictive ave-
nues of recovery available to Maryland litigants for economic loss 
claims arising out of a defective recreational vessel or its component 
parts.26 Initially, admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in 
476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986». Economic loss also includes costs of replacement, 
repair, or lost profits awarded as consequential damages. See id. at 263 & n.24 
(quoting Lower Lake Dock Co. v. Messinger Bearing Corp., 577 A.2d 631, 634 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990». It includes" 'damages resulting from the loss of use of 
the producL' " [d. at 263 & n.25 (quoting Lucker Mfg. v. Milwaukee Steel 
Foundry, 777 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1991». In addition, "[i]t has also 
been defined' as the 'diminution in value of the product because it is inferior 
in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manu-
factured and sold.' " [d. at 263-64 & n.26 (quoting Note, Manufacturer's Liabil-
ity to Remote Purchasers for '']<.conomic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contmct?, 114 U. PA 
L REv. 539, 541 (~966». 
20. SPA! infra Parts V. & VI.B. 
21. SPA! infra notes 267-320, 311-13 and accompanying text. 
22. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.s. 858, 871 
(1986). 
23. See 8 BENEnrcr ON ADMIRALlY § 4.02[B] & 4-14 n.32 (Steven F. Friedell ed., 7th 
ed. 1998)("Without question, once the United States Supreme Court has en-
dorsed a principle its status as established substantive maritime law is se-
cure. ")(citing .east River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 865). 
24. SPA! GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BlACK. JR., THE LAw Of ADMIRALlY § I-I & I 
n.1 (2d ed. 1975) ("[T]he terms 'admiralty' and 'maritime law' are virtually 
synonymous in [the United States] today, though the first derives from the 
connection of our modem law with the system administered in a single En-
glish court, while the second makes a wider and more descriptive refer-
ence."). 
25. In O'Hara v. Bayliner, 679 N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (N.V. 1997), the Court of Appeals 
of New York observed that this admiralty case had a "complicated procedural 
path" despite a "relatively straightforward" issue to resolve. O'Hara, 679 
N.E.2d at 1051; S('A! also Jeffery V. Brown, Good Things Come in WeU-Defined Pack-
ages: The Simple Elegance of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. The Sam Houston, 25 
STETSON L.R. 123, 123 n.2 (1995) ("At times, in fact, the complexity has been 
so great that Congress has intervened in an attempt to provide simplifica-
tion ... however, admiralty continues to complicate the uncomplicated."). 
26. See infra Parts VII.A & B. 
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general will be examined.27 Then specific subject-matter jurisdiction 
over maritime tort claims28 and maritime contract claims29 will be 
separately discussed to expose the differing jurisdictional require-
ments for each cause of action.30 This Comment will then address 
the limited recovery in tort for a defective marine product that does 
not cause personal injury or property damage, other than to the 
product itself.3) Next, this Comment will review two marine prod-
ucts liability cases decided with contrary results in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland and contrast them with 
treatments from courts in other jurisdictions.32 Finally, this Com-
ment will conclude that Maryland courts should uphold the tradi-
tional uniformity and consistency associated with admiralty law 
when addressing a claim that genuinely implicates maritime 
interests.33 
II. SOURCES OF ADMIRAL1Y LAW 
Admiralty cases are governed by principles of maritime law 
drawn from case law to form "an amalgam of traditional common-
law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules."34 
Guiding the resolution of maritime claims are these rules of the 
27. See infra Parts IV.A & BA. Personal jurisdiction over the parties is required for 
in personam actions in accordance with the court's rules and appropriate case 
law. See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3671, at 261 
nAO (1998) (citing Volkswagon de Mexico v. Germenischer Lloyd, 768 F. 
Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y 1991». No matter whether a federal or state court hears 
a claim, the requirement for personal jurisdiction is governed by the same 
due process principles; however, there are differing procedural rules to con-
sider. See id. In contrast, actions involving maritime attachment or the arrest 
of a vessel are exclusively heard in rem in the federal district courts. See Conti-
nental Grain Co. v. The Barge FBlr585, 364 U.S. 19, 35-36 (1960) (Whittaker, 
J., dissenting) ("From its earliest history to the present time, this Court has 
consistently held that an admiralty proceeding in rem is one essentially against 
the vessel itself as the debtor or offending thing, and, in such an action, the vessel 
itself is impleaded as the defendant, seized, judged and sentenced."); see also 
1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 124, at 8-15 ("The right to proceed in rem is the 
distinctive remedy of the admiralty and is administered exclusively by the 
United States courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction."). 
28. See infra Part IV.B.l. 
29. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
30. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
31. See infra Part V. 
32. See infra Parts VII and VIII.A. 
33. See infra Parts VIII.B and IX. 
34. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986). 
See also infra notes 100, 121. 
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"general mantlme law. "35 Unlike common law,36 these rules are 
drawn from ancient sea codes,37 a form of civil law38 codified by 
maritime trading nations.39 
To determine whether to adopt a particular tenet of maritime 
law, a court sitting in admiraltyW will often look to the underlying 
35. As an admiralty term of art, "[ t] he general maritime law derives from customs, 
principles and rules of international maritime commerce which developed 
over many centuries." 8 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 5.01[A][I], at 5-5. See also 
infra note 121. 
36. See BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990) ("The 'common law' is all the 
statutory and case law background of England and the American colonies 
before the American revolution.") (citing People v. Rehman, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 
85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967». 
37. See WYNDHAM ANTIs BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAw MERCHANT 70-71 (1923 
reprinted 1986) (collecting a translation of four articles from the Code of 
Hammurabi, the most ancient shipping laws known); see also 1 BENEDICT, supra 
note 23, § 2 & 1-3 n.l; THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARrnME LAw, 
§ 1-2 (2d ed. 1994). 
38. See BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990). Civil law is defined as "[t]he 
system of jurisprudence held and administered in the Roman empire, particu-
larly as set forth in the compilation of Justinian and his successors ... [and] 
denominated [as] the 'Corpus Juris Civilis,'-as distinguished from the common 
law of England." fd. 
39. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 104 & 7-5 n.l ("American maritime law, like 
the English maritime law, is not a branch of the common law of England." 
(citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970»). As noted by 
one commentator, "[m]aritime law in England took its [character]/and inspi-
ration from the Civil Law." fd. & 7-5 n.2 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-87 
n.5). According to the Supreme Court: 
Maritime law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing 
apart from the common law. It was, to a large extent, administered 
by different courts; it owed a much greater debt to the civil law; and, 
from its focus on a particular subject matter, it developed general 
principles law. 
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 386-87 & n.5 (citation omitted). 
40. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 24, at § 1-9 (explaining admiralty jurisdiction 
and procedure of the courts). Originally separate prior to 1966, the procedu-
ral rules for admiralty and civil cases are now consolidated, but still permit 
special handling of matters that exist only in admiralty. See id. All of the cases 
heard before the consolidation of the procedural rules: 
are set in the frame of the older terminology and practice. Such 
cases [from 1787 until 1966] are spoken of as being "in admiralty," 
the complaint is the "libel" and so on .... [However,] "today's 
equivalent to . . . being 'in admiralty' is . . . either a case in which 
the admiralty ground is the only ground of federal jurisdiction, or a 
case in which, out of more than one possible ground of such jurisdic-
tion, the plaintiff in [the] complaint designates the admiralty 
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policy reasons of the general maritime law or some historical basis 
for a rule's promulgation. Perhaps more than any other substantive 
area of the law, admiralty draws from historical policies concerning 
trade.41 Local, non-commercial concerns were unimportant to the 
major tenets of the general maritime law as it evolved over time.42 
Whether state or federal, all courts must defer to the settled princi-
ples of the general maritime law; its historical roots43 are "over twice 
the age of the common law."44 
ground." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
41. See GERARD J. MANGONE. UNITED STATES ADMIRALlY LAw 1 (1997) ("From its in-
ception . . . maritime law involved navigation and trade between diverse com-
munities so that (judges] were driven to find principles and application that 
would have common standards between people of different countries. "); see 
also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1874). The Lottawanna 
Court held that the Constitution: 
assumes that the meaning of the phrase "admiralty and maritime ju-
risdiction" is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cog-
nate ones of common law and equity, when it speaks of "cases in law 
and equity," or of "suits at common law," without [defining] those 
terms, assuming them to be known and understood. One thing, how-
ever, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a sys-
tem of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole 
country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the 
rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of 
the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and 
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a com-
mercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each 
other or with foreign states. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
42. The general maritime law is more than a rule of law of the court in which it is 
applied. See, e.g., Park v. United States Lines, Inc., 50 Md. App. 389, 398, 439 
A.2d 10, 15 (1982). In Park, a state court action, the court of special appeals 
observed that "although the plaintiffs have decided to proceed outside the ad-
miralty of the United States District Courts, they take with them the features 
peculiar to admiralty law." Id. (citing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 
406,408-10 (1953». Once the Supreme Court fashions a rule or Congress en-
acts legislation to govern maritime law disputes, it is then applied in all subse-
quent admiralty actions whether heard in federal or state courts. See also 
supra note 23. 
43. See Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V fA. Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 985 & n.11 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (citing an ancient sea code as historical authority when examining 
the underlying policy reasons for a salvage award). 
44. Warren J. Marwedel, Admiralty Jurisdiction Recreational Craft Personal Injury Issues, 
68 TUL L. REv. 423, 424 & n.1 (1994) (citing EDWARD E. CoHEN. ANCIENT ATHE-
NIAN MARmME CoURTS 8 (1973». 
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A. The Sea Codes 
The substantive maritime law grew out of the sea codes of an-
tiquity that now form a part of the lex merchantia-the law 
merchant.45 Existing well before English common law,46 the law 
merchant was the first private, international law.47 This ancient "dis-
pute-settling activity . . . allowed trading people the competency to 
iron out their own troubles amongst themselves. "48 The recorded 
sea codes provided settlement predictability for maritime business 
disputes and encouraged maritime ventures, the success of which 
were far from predictable due to the perils of the sea,49 danger 
from piracy,50 or war between nations.51 
45. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 886 (6th ed. 1990) (defining law merchant as a "body 
of law governing commercbl transactions which had its origin in common law 
of England regulating merchants."). Although "there is some initial obscurity 
as to what . . . constituted . . . the substance of the lex mercatoria, [] it may 
best be defined as the law administered as between merchants in the consular 
or commercial courts, some of it being substantive law and some rules of evi-
dence and procedure." BEWES, supra note 37, at 14; see also DAVID ROWEN & 
MICHAEL C. ToLLEY, COURTS OF AnMIRALlY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 7-11 (1995) 
(examining Maryland's colonial era admiralty courts). 
46. See GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § I-I, at 1 (discussing the historical origin 
of substantive maritime law). 
47. See BEWES, supra note 37, at 15. 
48. GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-3, at 5. 
49. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6 & 1-21 to 1-27 n.l (Rules of Oleron). One 
court defined perils of the sea as "those perils which are peculiar to the sea, 
and which are of [such] extraordinary nature ... or overwhelming power, 
and which cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human 
skill and prudence." The Giulia, 218 F. 744, 746 (2d Cir. 1914). 
50. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6 & 1-21 to 1-27 n.l (Rules of Oleron). The 
corsairs of old are not just a historical curiosity. There are more than 250 pi-
rate attacks on merchant vessels reported each year to the International Mari-
time Bureau's Piracy Centre. See generally Holger Jensen, High-Seas Piracy, J. OF 
COM., May 14, 1998. These attacks result in annual losses of more than $16 
billion each year. See id.; see also Philippe B. Moulier, et aI., Pirates? What Pi-
rates? A Growing Problem the Shipping Industry Would Like to Ignore, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REp., June 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8332249. 
51. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6 & 1-21 to 1-27 n.l (Rules of Oleron). Op-
posing military forces have historically targeted merchant shipping as a strate-
gic method of stopping lines of supply or as a measure of punishment. For in-
stance, during the armed conflict between Britain and Argentina over the 
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, the empty, Liberian-registered oil tanker 
Hercules owned by American interests was attacked without warning by Argen-
tine military aircraft using bombs and air-to-surface rockets. See Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 
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King Richard the Lionhearted introduced one particularly note-
worthy sea code, the Rules of Oleron,52 to medieval England.53 Por-
tions of this sea code constitute an influential part of the current 
Anglo-American general maritime law,54 law of insurance contracts,55 
and law governing maritime salvage.56 The sea codes were also the 
source for a captain's command authority,57 no matter whether he 
was serving as the master of a commercial vessel at sea58 or sailing 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
While assisting in the rescue of survivors from a sunken Argentine warship, 
the tanker was attacked 600 miles offshore of Argentina and 500 miles from 
the Falkland Islands by the Argentine Air Force. See Thomas M. DiBiagio. Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Over Foreign Guvemments for Violations of International Lam: Foreign 
Shipping Immunity and the Alien Tort Statute After Amerada Hess Shipping COIl>-
v. Argentine Republic, 12 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 153, 171 (1988). 
52. The Rules of Ole ron were said to have been "promulgated, on the small is-
land off the French west coast from which it takes it~ name, by Eleanor of Aq-
uitaine, on her return from her spectacular course of misconduct in the Holy 
Land." GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-3, at 7; see also MANGONE. supra 
note 41, at 7-9. The Rules of Oleron strongly influenced English admiralty 
law, which adopted m"any of them into the Black Book of Admiralty. See MAN-
GONE, supra note 41, at 7-9. Moreover, the Rules of Oleron have "always been 
regarded as having an especial importance for the maritime law of England, 
and hence for that of the United States." GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 
1-3, at 7. 
53. See GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, §§ 1-3 to 14 (analyzing the historical sig-
nificance of the medieval sea codes on the English legal system and the subse-
quent effect on colonial American courts); MANGONE, supra note 41, at 7-9. 
54. One of the more significant contributions to the general maritime law is the 
concept of general average. If cargo is jettisoned to save a sinking ship or 
from other perils of the sea, the saved cargo's owners and the ship jointly 
contribute to offset the loss. See 1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 34; see also GILMORE 
& BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-2. 
55. See 1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1. 
56. See Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V J.A. Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 985 & n.ll (5th 
Cir. 1998) (observing that where mariners voluntarily act to save property 
from a maritime peril, they may be entitled to salvage award and that this 
doctrine can be found in ancient sea codes, including the Rules of Oleron). 
57. See 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, § 6, at 1-21 n.1 (citing a modem translation 
from a French publication of the Rules of Oleron, dated 1485, entitled "The 
Judgments of the Sea, of Masters, of Mariners, and Merchants, and all their 
doings."). 
58. See 46 U .S.C. § 10,101 (1) (1994) (defining master as "the individual having 
command of a vessel"); see also Tile Transfer No. 12,221 F. 409, 412 (2d Cir. 
1915) ("[T]here is but one maSter, who is not only navigator, but judge of 
and governor over the whole [maritime] adventure."); GEORGE L. CANFIELD & 
GWRGE W. DAlZELL, THE lAw OF THE SEA 39 (1926) ("The master ... has full 
charge ol~ and personal responsibility for the navigation and control of the 
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as skipper of a recreational vessel on the Chesapeake Bay. 59 
Notwithstanding their age, the sea codes are more than histori-
cal artifact; throughout the evolution of the general maritime law in 
the United States, the sea codes have provided useful guidance.60 In 
1795, a federal court observed: 
[F] ar from sound principles becoming obsolete, or injured 
by time . . . it will be found, on careful investigation, that 
the oldest sea laws we know . . . furnished the outline and 
leading character of the whole ... [and] we need not hesi-
tate to be guided by the rules and principles, established in 
the maritime laws.61 
More than 200 years later, another federal court again cited the 
sea codes, specifically one of the surviving Rules of Oleron gov-
erning marine salvage, as useful guidance to the resolution of Mar-
gate Shipping Co. v. M/V fA. Orgcron.62 The master and crew of the 
tanker Cherry Valley saved a space shuttle's external fuel tank from 
near certain destruction when the tug and barge flotilla delivering it 
were threatened by a severe tropical storm.63 The court concluded 
that the sea code was helpful historical authorityM underlying the 
traditional factors65 governing the salvage reward for saving a vessel 
ship, passengers, crew and cargo."). 
59. See CHARLES F. CHAPMAN. PILOTING. SEAMANSIDP AND SMAll BOAT HANDUNG 474 
(51st ed. 1974) ("By custom and by law, the skipper of a [recreational] craft 
has the sole ultimate responsibility and authority, aboard especially in emer-
gencies.") . 
60. See Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F.Cas. 1028, 1031 (D.C. Pa. 1795) (using the 
sea codes as a guideline to determine whether seamen were due wages). 
61. Id. at 1030. 
62. 143 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1998). 
63. See id. at 981-83. 
64. See id. at 985 & n.ll. 
65. See id. at 984 (discussing The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869». The 
Blackwall factors include: 
1. The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage ser-
vice. 2. The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the 
service, and the saving the property. 3. The value of the property em-
ployed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to 
which such property was exposed. 4. The risk incurred by the salvors 
in securing the property from the impending peril. 5. The value of 
the property saved. 6. The degree of danger from which the property 
was rescued. 
Id. (quoting The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869». 
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in danger of foundering. 66 The federal court cited the Rules of 
Oleron and noted that" [s]ince time immemorial, the mariner who 
acted voluntarily to save property from peril on the high seas has 
been entitled to a reward [and t]his simple rule has been an inte-
gral part of maritime commerce in the western world since the west-
ern world was civilized. "67 As a result, the court re-affirmed the im-
portance of the sea codes to modem admiralty law, but reduced the 
largest salvage award in recorded history to the tankship's owner 
and crew.68 
B. Historical Rnots of American Admiralty Jurisdiction 
The historical roots of American admiralty jurisdiction are 
grounded in a more modem era: the American colonial age.69 Ma-
ryland, like other colonies of Britain, had its own vice-admiralty 
courts70 to hear prize cases71 and cases of maritime crimes that oc-
curred on the sea,. including piracy72 and "instance"73 private mari-
time claims.74 The Articles of Confederation created a general asso-
66. See id. at 985. 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 979-80. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana mis-
takenly overvalued the cost of the space shuttle's external fuel tank when it 
"awarded approximately $6.4 million in salvage." !d. That award was reduced 
to $4.25 million by the Margate Shipping Co. court. See id. 
69. See William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Pri-
vateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 122 (1993) ("Before 
the Revolutionary War, Great Britain ... operated imperial vice-admiralty 
courts throughout the colonies."). During the American Revolution and the 
Confederacy, most states had their own admiralty courts. See id. at 122-23. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress created the 
first national court of limited admiralty jurisdiction. See id. at 123. 
70. See OWEN & ToLLEY, supra note 45, at 46, 54 (noting that Maryland's vice-admi-
ralty court was established in 1694). 
71. See id. at 103 (documenting the early history of Maryland's admiralty courts). 
Prize cases were disputes arising out of the capture of enemy vessels by Royal 
Navy ships or licensed privateers-legally sanctioned pirates under a letter of 
marque who supplemented regular naval forces in the time of war. See id. at 
156. These seizures were a means of enforcing navigation laws by obtaining 
lawful title to the ship and its cargo for violations. See id. at 156, 16()..(j2. The 
authors include one synopsis of a prize case from 1703 where the HMS Oxford 
captured a French merchant ship loaded with a cargo of sugar and brought 
her to Maryland. See id. at 298-99. 
72. See id. at 170-72 (detailing piracy cases and other maritime crimes in colonial 
Maryland). 
73. See e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 799 (6th ed. 1990). See also infra note 74. 
74. See OWEN & ToLLEY, supra note 45, at 150-52. 
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ciation among the thirteen states and devised a national 
government with limited powers, including the "narrow admiralty 
jurisdiction over 'the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the 
high seas; and ... appeals in all cases of capture.' "75 However, the 
Confederacy's national court of limited admiralty jurisdiction76 
could not adjudicate some public litigation such as prize cases or 
cases of instance.77 These cases were left to the states.?8 The political 
flaws in the Articles of Confederation led to the Constitutional Con~ 
vention's drafting of the United States Constitution, which included 
"the call for the creation of federal admiralty courts."79 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS AND FEDERAL-
ISM CONCERNS OF AMERICAN ADMIRAL1Y LAW 
A. The Constitutional Mandate 
The United States Constitution gave the federal courts the ex-
clusive powel.80 to hear "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction. "81 Exercising its own power when creating the lower federal 
courts, Congress "expressly reserved to state courts the power to 
hear in personam admiralty and maritime cases. "82 Once again, ad-
75. Casto, su/J7"fl note 69, at 128 & n.59 (quoting ART. OF CONFED. art. 9 § I 
(1777». 
76. .\ee id. at 122-23. 
77. See OWEN & TOLLEY. supra note 45, at 123-24. 
78. See Casto, supra note 69, at 127-28. 
79. See id. at 129. 
80. The grant of exclusive original admirdlty jurisdiction was expressly conferred 
by section nine of the Judicial), Act of 1789, which is now codified as 28 
U .S.C. § 1333. 
81. U.S. CON~"T. art. 1II, § 2, cl. I; see Harrington Putnam, Hmo the Federal Courts 
Wim! Given Admiralty jurisllictilm, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 469-70 (1925) ("[T]he 
Convention ... accept[ed] a uniform Federal system, a'l essential to maritime 
commerce."). As noted by one of the Founders: "[C]ases of admirdlty and 
maritime jurisdiction al'e 'the fifth of the enumerated classes of causes proper 
f()r cogni7.ance of the National Court'!.' " /d. at 469-70 (quoting THE FEDERAL.-
IST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ford's ed. 1908». ' 
82. Thompson, supra note 17, at 223,226 & n.15 (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)(1994»; see II/sO The Hinev. Trevor, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 555 (1866). In nIP HiM, the Supreme Court explained that: 
[i] t must be taken ... as the settled law of this [C]ourt; that wher-
ever the District Court'! of the United States have original cognizance 
of admirdlty causes, by virtue of the Act of 1789, that cognizance is 
exclusive, and no othel' court, state 01' national,. can exercise it, with 
. the exception always of such conculTent remedy as is given by the 
comlnon law. . 
/d. at 568-69. As to when admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive, it "has been intel'-
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miralty jurisdiction was centralized in a nationwide judiciary,83 with 
the reservation that some admiralty claims could be heard in state 
courts.84 Yet, even with concurrent jurisdiction, "[a] state cannot 
confer [admiralty jurisdiction] on [its own] State courts. "85 
Underlying the rationale to leave certain claims within the con-
current jurisdiction of the state courts may have been the lack of 
national interest over private maritime claims.86 Whether the Fram-
ers intended a distinction between private87 and public88 maritime 
litigation, such as that drawn under the Articles of Confederation,89 
is open to scholarly debate.90 
B. Statutory Adjustments to the Federal System 
Statutorily, Congress also saved the right to a common law rem-
edy for all suitors.91 The saving to suitors clause grants concurrent 
jurisdiction for in personam92 actions in state courts for some admi-
preted as making federal court admiralty jurisdiction exclusive as to actions in 
rem against vessels or against other maritime property." David W. Robertson, 
Admiralty and Maritime Litigation in State Court, 55 LA. L. REv. 685, 698 (1995). 
In addition, " 'certain statutory actions,' including petitions for limitation of 
liability, and suits against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act 
and the Public Vessels Act" are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the 
federal district court sitting in admiralty. Id. at 698-99. 
83. See Marwedel, supra note 44, at 425 ("Until a criminal case was reported in 
1863, every prior Maryland district court opinion published in the federal re-
porters had involved the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.") (citing United 
States v. Cashiel, 25 F. Cas. 318 (D. Md. 1863». 
84. See Casto, supra note 69, at 139-40; see also infra Part III.B. 
85. MELVIN M. CoHEN, AnMlRALlY JURISDICTION, LAw, AND PRACTICE 1 & n.2 (1883). 
86. See Casto, supra note 69, at 128-29. 
87. See id. at 128. 
88. See id. 
89. During the Confederacy, there was: 
Id. 
a dichotomy between admiralty cases that directly affected the na-
tional interest and private maritime litigation that had at most an in-
direct impact upon the national interest. Provision was made for a 
national admiralty jurisdiction over the former while the latter was 
left to the exclusive powet of the individual states. 
90. See id. at 118 ("There is no evidence ... that the Founding Generation 
thought of maritime litigation primarily in terms of private civil litigation."). 
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(l) (1994). This statute provides in pertinent part: "The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the 
States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to 
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Id. 
This section is commonly known as the saving to suitors clause. 
92. If an action is filed in personam, the plaintiff must still establish personal ju-
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ralty claims.93 Once brought in the state court under the saving to 
suitors clause, an admiralty claim may not be removed94 to federal 
court, unless federal jurisdiction could have been initially exercised 
under the original jurisdiction statutes.95 This is despite the appar-
risdiction over the defendants. See supra note 93. In federal court, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) governs service of process beyond the reach of 
the federal court's jurisdiction. See FED. R CIV. PRO. 4(e). 
93. To file an action in a Maryland state court that is consistent with due process 
requirements, the plaintiff must be able to reach the defendant by use of the 
long-arm statute and provide proper service. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. 
PROC. §§ 6-102, 6-103 (1995) (establishing a long-arm statute to the limit of 
constitutionality); MD. R CIV. P. 2-121 to -126 (governing service of process on 
defendants); see also Allen v. Allen, 105 Md. App. 359, 366-68, 659 A.2d 411, 
414-15 (1995) (observing that personal jurisdiction must be established prior 
to the court imposing an obligation or liability on a defendant). See also supra 
note 27. Actions in rem, which are uniquely maritime claims against the vessel 
itself and give rise to a maritime lien, are exclusively heard in federal courts 
sitting in admiralty. See supra note 82. 
94. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3721, at 286-88 ("Removal is quite an 
anomalous form of su~ect matter jurisdiction."). See generaUy Kenneth G. En-
gerrand, Removal and Remand of Admiralty Suits, 21 Tm.. MAR. LJ. 383, 384-93 
(1997) (analyzing the removal statute and several admiralty applications). 
95. See Lewis v. United States, 812 F. Supp. 620, 622-23 (E.D. Va. 1993); see also 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 2-3 & 82 n.13 ("[T]he rule has developed that 
admiralty saving-clause cases properly filed in state court cannot be removed 
unless admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive."). Thus, state in personam claims 
can remain in state court, unless original federal jurisdiction was proper 
under diversity jurisdiction or the claim has a federal question element. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing the requirements for federal question juris-
diction); id. (providing .the requirements for diversity jurisdiction). 
Yet, admiralty jurisdiction itself is not a federal question for the purposes of 
removal because "it would make considerable inroads into the traditionally 
exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty matters-a 
jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of the saving clause of 1789 to 
preserve." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372 
(1959), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine 
Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990). Moreover, the Romero Court opined: 
An infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the federal question 
grant would not occasion merely an isolated change; it would gener-
ate many new complicated problems. If jurisdiction of maritime 
claims were allowed to be invoked under § 1331, it would become 
necessary for courts to decide whether the action arises under fed-
eral law, and this jurisdictional decision would largely depend on 
whether the governing law is state or federal. Determinations of this 
nature are among the most difficult and subtle that federal courts 
are called upon to make. 
[d. at 375 & n.43 (citing Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1968) (internal 
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ently express command of the federal removal statute.96 
With the saving to suitors clause, Congress specifically reserved 
the right of parties to access remedies under state decisional law if 
the common law court is competent to give it and when the remedy 
does not offend admiralty uniformity and consistency principles.97 
Thus, Maryland's state courts are competent to hear in personam 
maritime cases,98 at least "to the extent that distinctive admiralty 
remedies are not involved and . . . not prohibited by [federal] stat-
ute."99 Even Maryland state courts must apply general maritime law 
quotation marks omitted); see also Engerrand, supra note 94, at 386 (discussing 
the Romero Court's rejection of general maritime jurisdiction being brought 
into federal question jurisdiction). 
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). This statute provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where such 
action is pending. 
Id.; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 2-3, at 81-82 ("Removal is a favorite 
weapon of the defense in maritime cases .... [A] case is subject to removal if 
it could have been brought originally in federal district court, unless forbid-
den by act of Congress .... "). 
97. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 2-2 & 81-82 n.2 (noting that the courts are 
competent at least to the extent of "the common law . . . in all cases where 
the suit is in personam") (citing Bergeron v. Quality Shipyards Inc., 765 F. 
Supp. 321, 322-23 (E.D. La. 1991». 
98. Maryland's appellate reports contain few recent opinions where a party exer-
cised concurrent admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the "savings to suitors" 
clause to bring maritime tort claims. See Pine St. Trading Corp. v. Farrell 
Lines, Inc., 278 Md. 363, 379-80, 364 A.2d 1103, 1114 (1976) (addressing a 
claim where a cargo of beet sugar was damaged by antimony dust); Standard 
Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals Corp., 193 Md. 
20, 24, 65 A.2d 304, 305 (1949) (concerning the injuries of a plaintiff injured 
while working in a ship's hold); Park v. United States Lines, Inc., 50 Md. App. 
389, 397-98, 439 A.2d 10, 15 (1982) (concerning the deaths of crane operators 
where the defendants failed to suspend cargo operations during a period of 
very high winds); Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 33 Md. 
App. 372, 381-82, 365 A.2d 325, 334-35 (1976) (concerning damage to and par-
tial loss of a cargo of handtools). 
99. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-2; accord 1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 14 ("Mari-
time law was never intended as an all-inclusive and definitive system. The in-
terplay between state law and federal law has always recognized that state law 
could supplement the maritime law where not otherwise inconsistent and an-
tagonistic to its characteristic features."). See also infra note 103. 
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in admiralty actions,100 a species of federal common law, 101 which is 
controlling. I02 While Maryland statutory and case law may impact an 
action characterized as maritime in nature,103 it does not normally 
alter the application of substantive admiralty law. 104 
The saving clause has burdened the state courts with the "toler-
ably to diabolically difficult" task of choosing and applying the 
proper substantive law and remedy. lOS In Chelentis v. Luckenbach 
Steamship COrp.,I06 the Supreme Court explained that the saving to 
suitors clause does not "give the complaining party an election to 
determine whether the defendant's liability [and the remedy] shall 
be measured by common-law standards rather than those of the 
maritime law."I07 Here, the plaintiff was injured aboard a merchant 
100. The general maritime law is " [d]rawn from state and federal sources, the gen-
eral maritime law an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications 
of those rules, and newly created rules." East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 & n.2 (1986) (citing Kermarec v. Compa-
gnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959); Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 354 U.S. 354, 373-75 (1959), superseded Uy stat-
ute as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990». 
101. See 19 WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 27, § 4514, at 452. ("[A]lthough there is no 
'general' federal common law, it is now recognized that in certain narrowly 
defined but extremely important circumstances the federal courts may fashion 
'specialized' federal common law-substantive rules of decision not expressly 
authorized by either the Constitution or any Act of Congress-that supplant 
state law."). 
102. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 V.S. 205, 216 (1917), superseded on other 
grounds Uy, 33 U.S.C. §§ 90144 (1994 & Supp. III 1997»; see also supra Parts 
III.B & C. 
103. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1, at 97 n.9. ("Federal courts may, and 
often do, look to state statutory law and to precepts of the common law which 
they 'borrow' and apply as the federal admiralty rule." (citing Petition of 
Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719-21 (2d Cir. 1964»). 
104. See Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 33 Md. App. 372, 
381, 365 A.2d 325, 334 (1976) (noting that state courts must apply substantive 
maritime law in admiralty actions). But see Green v. Industrial Helicopters, 
Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La. 1992) (holding that predominately local inter-
ests mandated application of state law instead of substantive maritime law); see 
also Thomas A. Russell & Richard J. Nikas, Recent Developments in Recreational 
Boating Law, 9 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 381, 384 (1997) ("It is increasingly common ... 
for courts to apply state law to a situation that should be decided using gen-
eral maritime law."). 
105. David W. Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases After 
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TuL. MAR. LJ. 81, 83 (1996). 
106. 247 U.S. 372 (1918). 
107. fd. at 384. 
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ship while at sea.108 Instead of pursuing the traditional remedies in 
admiralty, the seafarer sued in state court and alleged negligence 
against the vessel's owner.l09 The Chelentis Court held that, regard-
less of whether a claim is heard in a state or federal court, the 
rights affected and the remedies applied are "those of the sea."11O 
The Court observed that had it permitted a recovery under the 
common law, "such a substitution would distinctly and definitely 
change or add to the settled maritime law; and it would be destruc-
tive of the 'uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution 
aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the inter-
course of the states with each other or with foreign states.' "111 
In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit confirmed the continuing vitality of the Chelentis holding in Ma-
ryland Department of Natural Resources v. Kellum. 112 In Kellum, a tug· 
and barge flotilla exited Breton Bay and was heading down the Po-
108. See id. at 378. 
109. See id. at 378-79. 
110. Id. at 384. However, the United States Supreme Court again recently departed 
from the traditional view of admiralty uniformity by allowing litigants to pur-
sue remedies under state law where federal law is silent. See Yamaha Motor 
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202-04 (1996) (addressing the punitive 
damage claims-traditionally not available in admiralty--of the parents of a 
young girl who had died while riding a jet ski); see also Thomas M. DiBiagio, 
Fostering Uniform Substantive Law and &covery-The Demise of Punitive Damages in 
Admiralty and Maritime Personal Injury and Death Claims, 25 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 
14 n.77 (1995) (noting that the lower appellate court in Calhoun v. Yamaha 
Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 636 (3d Cir. 1994), openly suggested that the uni-
formity principle had less weight than previously thought). This trend contin-
ues; according to one noted academic scholar: 
Since handing down Jensen and Chelentis, the [United States] Su-
preme Court [as of 1996] has issued fifty-three significant decisions 
in which state law ·and federal maritime law came into conflict. In 
twenty-nine of those, state law triumphed over the competing claims 
of federal maritime law. The other twenty-four held that federal mari-
time law displaced state law. 
Robertson, supra note 105, at 89-90 &nn.50-53. 
Ill. Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 382 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 
215 (1917) (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 21 (Wall.) 558,575 (1874»). See 
also supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
112. 51 F.3d 1220, 1226 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit commented that "we 
find ample authority that state law may not be applied if it conflicts with, or 
seeks to materially change, federal maritime law." Id. (citing Chelentis v. Luck-
enbach S.S. Corp., 247 U.S. 372 (1918»; see also Samuel C. Steinbach, Recent 
Decisions, The· Maryland Survey: 1994-1995, 55 MD. L. REv. 1033, 1043-44 
( 1996). 
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tomac River.ll3 The tow, which was owned and operated by C.G. 
Willis, Inc. and commanded by Captain Kellum, was loaded with 
pea gravel from the Maryland Rock Industrial Dock at Lovers Point, 
and had a maximum draft of nine and a half feet.1l4 The barge ran 
aground at Huggins Point onto an oyster bar owned by the State of 
Maryland. 1l5 State authorities subsequently stopped the flotilla, com-
plaining about property damage to the oyster bed.116 
The' Kellum court began its analysis by observing that naviga-
tional errors that result in property damage due to the grounding 
of a vessel have traditionally been considered maritime torts, subject 
to federal maritime law. ll7 Holding that the Maryland statute1l8 im-
parting strict liability for the damage offended the admiralty rule of 
liability, the Kellum court refused to apply state law.ll9 The Kellum 
court expressly affirmed the importance of the Chelentis uniformity 
principlel20 and concluded that federal positive law, whether taken 
from the general maritime law or statutory in origin,121 is clearly 
113. See Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1221. 
114. See id. at 1221-22. 
115. See id. at 1222. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 1223 ("The alleged injury to Maryland's oyster bar resulted from an 
occurrence unique to maritime law, the stranding of a vessel. On review of 
the relevant law, we find ... that damage to property caused by a stranding 
in navigable waters is uniformly treated as a maritime tort."). 
U8. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. I § 4-1118.1 (1995). The statute reads in perti-
nent part: "[A] person may not destroy, damage, or injure any oyster bar, 
reef, rock, or other area located on a natural oyster bar in the Chesapeake 
Bay .... " Id. 
119. See Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1226 (citing Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384); see also Steinbach, 
supra note 112, at 1037 ("While states retain legislative power over actions that 
arise within their borders, state legislation cannot significantly alter the gen-
eral admiralty law."). 
120. See Kellum, 51 F.3d at 1226 (citing Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384). 
121. There are three major sources of substantive admiralty law. One such source 
is the general maritime law-federal common law fashioned by judicial deci-
sions in the federal courts sitting in admiralty in the absence of statutory gui-
dance by Congress. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 
U.S. 858, 864 (1986) ("Absent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as 
developed by the judiciary, applies."); see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-
1. Another source of substantive admiralty law is the federal statutes enacted 
by "Congress, exercising its constitutional powers under the Admiralty Clause 
and the Commerce Clause," many of which are codified in Titles 33 and 46 of 
the United States Code. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1. The third source 
of admiralty law stems from international sources; "[t]he smooth operation of 
the shipping industry has dictated that different nations should conform their 
1999] East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delaval 441 
supreme. 122 
C. Federal Preemption in Admiralty Products Liability Claims 
Given that a federal statute will preempt a contradictory state 
law for an admiralty claim,123 the potential for preemption is critical 
to adjudicating the marine products liability case. 124 For example, in 
the realm of products liability, federal and state courts have held 
that section 4306 of the Federal Safety Boating Actl25 preempts state 
laws. This is usually accomplished by negotiating an international convention 
on a particular topic" that is then adopted into domestic law. !d.; if. SIMON 
GAULT ET AL., Marsden on Collisions at Sea 1-3 (12th ed. 1998) ("An impor-
tant feature in this area of the law is that much of the relevant English statute 
law is based on international conventions, which are intended to achieve a de-
gree of uniformity between the laws of the States which are parties to those 
conven tions. ") . 
Congress has adopted many international standards and international con-
ventions by treaty, some of which have been codified as or referenced in fed-
eral statutes. The most significant example of this type of incorporation is the 
collision regulations, more commonly known as the "nautical rules of the 
road," that are applicable to all vessels whether or not commercial in nature. 
See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 868, 676 (1982); GAULT ET AL, 
supra note 121, at 1-21; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1. 
122. See generally, e.g., Charles L. Coleman, III, Federal Preemption of State ''BAP'' 
Laws: Repelling State Boarders in the Interests of Uniformity, 9 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 305, 
306 (1997) (observing that the supremacy of federal law flows from several 
Consitutional provisions, including the Supremacy Clause, Admiralty Clause, 
Commerce Clause, and Treaty Clause). 
123. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2. See also Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 615 (1953) 
(noting that Erie was "irrelevant" in a collision between two recreational ves-
sels) . 
124. See 14A WRIGm ET AL., supra note 27, § 3671, at 261 n.40 ("State law controls 
only in the absence of a federal statute, a judicially fashioned admiralty rule, 
and a need for uniformity in admiralty practice." (citing Suma Fruit Int'l v. 
Albany Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 34 (9th Cir. 1997»). 
125. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-11 (1994). Section 4306 of the Federal Safety Boating Act 
("FSBA") details the federal preemption of state law in certain circumstances, 
providing in pertinent part: 
Unless permitted by the Secretary [of Transportation] under section 
4305 . . . a State or a political subdivision of a State may not estab-
lish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a 
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law in several claims l26 for personal injuries suffered because a rec-
reational vehicle lacked propeller guards. 127 Moreover, a general 
recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other 
safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated equip-
ment ... thai is not identical to a regulation prescribed under sec-
tion 4302 of this title. 
Id. § 4306. 
126. See Davis v. BrunsWick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1993). SWimming in 
a Georgia lake, the plaintiff was struck by the unguarded propeller of a boat 
driven by her mother-in-law. See id. at 1576. Her action was dismissed on sum-
mary judgment because the FSBA preempted her state law design defect 
claim against the manufacturer for failure to provide a propeller guard. See id. 
at 1580-81. In Shields v. Outboard Marine Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579 (M.D. Ga. 
1991), the plaintiff was ejected from a recreational vessel because it struck a 
submerged object; she was injured by the boat's unguarded propeller. See id. 
at 1580. The plaintiff sought recovery under Florida state products liability 
law, but lost on summary judgment because of the FBSA's preemption clause. 
See id. at 1582. In Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F. 
Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1991), an individual was seriously injured by a 
powerboat's propeller while rafting on Lake Erie. See id. at 1013. The plaintiff 
filed suit, alleging that the product was defective because it lacked a propeller 
guard. See id. The admiralty claim seeking common law remedies was dis-
missed as being explicitly preempted by FSBA. See id. at 1017. But see Moore v. 
BrunsWick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994). In Moore, a 
sWimmer injured by a recreational motorboat's unguarded propeller sued 
under a theory of products liability but lost on summary judgment because 
the lower court held that the FSBA preempted state law. See id. at 247. The 
Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court, concluding that there was no 
express preemption l>y the FSBA, even though recognizing that four federal 
courts had held that FSBA preempted state law claims. See id. at 252. This 
holding was expressly rejected by Emily Moss v. Outboard Marine corp., Harris-
Kayot, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Cal. 1996). The federal preemption 
clause of the FSBA was recently before the Supreme Court; however, the 
Court dismissed the petition for certiorari prior to issuing a ruling. See LeWis 
v. BrunsWick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir.), cm. granted, 522 U.S. 978, cere. 
dismissed, 523 U.S. 1113 (1998). 
127. See Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1576; Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1580; Mowery, 773 F. 
Supp. at 1013. See also 2 ARTHUR C. DAMAsK ET AL., INJURY CAUSATION ANALYSES: 
CAsE STUDIES AND DATA SoURCES 225-26 (1993). Each year, people are seriously 
injured by recreational boat outboard motor propellers. See id. However, there 
is an overall lack of consumer product safety attention. See id. This is largely 
because: 
the potentially lethal blade, turning through the water, is not visible; 
therefore there is not the usual outcry from the populace against the 
lack of safety of such a device, even though it is the cause of a large 
number of serious injuries. If it were visible ... consumer product 
safety attention would be more insistent. 
Id. The authors recommend a propeller guard to protect persons in the water 
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maritime law rule, created by federal judicial decisions, will control 
a state court's determination of an admiralty products liability 
claim.128 Despite the apparently clear line that demarcates when the 
substantive maritime law applies and when state law applies, this 
concept has been extremely troubling for courts. 129 One court 
opined: "Discerning the law in this area is far from easy; one might 
tack a sailboat into a fog bank with more confidence."I30 
What is clear, however, is the need for consistent results by the 
courts exercising their admiralty jurisdiction.131 Only when courts 
uniformly adjudicate maritime claims will uniform principles result. 
As acknowledged in Chekntis v. Luckenbach Steamship Corp.,132 the Su-
preme Court recognizes that the purpose of admiralty law is to fos-
ter "the maritime commerce lying at the heart of the admiralty 
court's basic work."133 The Court has also recognized that the un-
derlying federal policies in support of that purpose pertain equally 
to recreational vessels, if maritime commerce is materially impacted 
in some manner.134 
However, state courts are eroding the substantive maritime law 
by increasingly applying state law to marine products liability ac-
from a risk of serious injury. See id. at 226. 
128. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 
(1986); see also 14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3671, at 261 n.39 ("Mari-
time torts apply principles of maritime negligence, not common law negli-
gence." (citing La Esperanza de P.R., Inc. v. Perez y Cia. De Puerto Rico, Inc., 
124 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1997»). 
129. See Robertson, supra note 105, at 81 & n.3 (noting that Justice Scalia has con-
cluded: " '[iJ t would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible 
from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty ju-
risprudence, or indeed is entirely consistent within our admiralty jurispru-
dence.' " (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 
(1994»). 
130. In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994). 
131. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990) ("The need for uniform rules of 
maritime conduct and liability is not limited to navigation, but extends at 
least to any other activities traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or 
noncommercial."); see also Lizabeth L. Burrell, Application of State Law to Mari-
time Claims: Is There a Better Guide than Southern Pacific v. Jensen?, 21 TUL. 
MAR. LJ. 53, 54-56 (1996) (commenting that lack of uniformity would "greatly 
burden commerce if everyone involved in the maritime trades were subject to 
different rules in different ports .... "). 
132. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
133. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 533 
(1995) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982». 
134. See Faremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 677. 
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tions. 135 This inclination is apparently based on the theory that the 
law to apply to recreational vesselsl36 is a distinct subset of admiralty 
law, which need not conform to admiralty's touchstone principle of 
uniformity and consistency.137 The inconsistent results can subvert 
the traditional commercial maritime interests' need for decisional 
stability.138 This trend undermines admiralty's goal of uniformity, as 
well as, the command of federal preemption-substantive federal 
law must control in state adjudication of issues when federal mari-
time interests are at stake,139 even for recreational vessel cases. 140 
135. See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384 (noting that it has been "incre~ 
ingly common ... for [state] courts to apply [their state] law to a situation 
that should be decided using general maritime law."). An excellent illustra-
tion of this trend is Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La. 
1992), cert. denied, 506 u.S. 819 (1992). For a discussion of this case, see infra 
notes 417-27 and accompanying text. See also Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & 
Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. 1994) (noting "tension between the 
concept that uniform safety regulations should be established at the federal 
level and the concept that a state may nevertheless award tort damages for 
unsafe products" and holding that "state law tort claims are not preempted by 
the Federal Boat Safety Act"). But see Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 
P.2d 15, 26 (Wash. 1993) ("Washington's interest in providing a [strict liabil-
ity] remedy for these plaintiffs does not outweigh federal interests in maritime 
uniformity."); see also Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384. 
136. See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384; see also CALIFORNIA STATE BAR Ass'N 
preface to CALIFORNIA BOATING LAw (1963) (discussing the "evolution of plea-
sure boating law"). 
137. See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384. But see id. n.13 (citing Lewis v. 
Timco, 716 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that maritime law is a 
"conceptual body [of law] whose cardinal mark is uniformity"». 
138. See Chel£ntis, 247 U.S. at 382 ("[1]1 would be destructive of the 'uniformity and 
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial 
character affecting the intercourse of the states with each other or with for-
eign states,' " (citing section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789»; see also Southern 
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917), superseded on other grounds, 33 
U.S.C. § 901 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (restricting the state's authority in mari-
time matters). 
139. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-1, at 95 n.4 (noting that the mandate of 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) "established the principle that 
federal district courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must try state-created 
causes of action in accordance with state laws-not federal common law-
[and] thus has no application in admiralty"). See Levinson v. Dupree, 345 U.S. 
648, 651 (1953) (observing that Erie was "irrelevant" in a case involving two 
motorboats). See also supra note 126. 
140. There is no distinction between a recreational vessel and a commercial vessel 
at least with respect to admiralty tort jurisdiction. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982). See also supra note 139. 
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There is no distinction between consumer-recreational boating 
and commercial vessel claims-" [r ] ecreational boating law does not 
exist as a separate legal discipline" 141-even though admiralty law is 
historically protective of commercial maritime interests. 142 While rec-
reational vessels in their current form are a recent invention,143 they 
are still governed by traditional admiralty principles. l44 Modern ad-
miralty law evolved from ancient concepts that govern shipping and, 
for the sake of uniformity and consistency, should apply to all ves-
sels, regardless of use. Therefore, there should be little, if any, dis-
tinction between recreational vessel and commercial vessel tort dis-
putes in the substantive admiralty law,145 including claims grounded 
in products liability. 146 
141. Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384. But see CAilFORNIA PLEAsURE BOATING 
LAw. supra 136, at 336 (discussing the "evolution of pleasure boating law"). 
However, "present indications are that courts will treat pleasure craft as they 
treat commercial vessels, [but] they yet may conclude, under pressure of com-
pelling argument, that the use of pleasure craft differs so greatly from that of 
commercial vessels that different rules should govern in some areas." Russell 
& Nikas, supra note 104, at 347-48. The Supreme Court has thus far rejected 
such a distinction. See Fumnost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-75. 
142. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-75. ("[T]he primary focus of admiralty ju-
risdiction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce. . . . [But] 
[t]he federal interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately 
served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually en-
gaged in commercial maritime activity."). 
143. There are increasing numbers of recreational vessels on American waterways. 
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 3. Nationwide, in 1976, there were 
7,671,213 boats registered by state authorities as compared to 11,877,938 boats 
numbered by 1996--an increase of 4,206,725 numbered boats over a 20-year 
period. See id. at 20. 
144. See 8 BENEDlcr, supra note 23, § 1.01 at 1-4 ("It is now unifonnly accepted that 
claims involving pleasure boats fall within admiralty jurisdiction so long as the 
established conditions for admiralty tort or contract jurisdiction are satisfied 
in a particular case. "); see also Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 384. 
145. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. 
146. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 363, 365-
66 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the East River economic loss rule to a plaintiff's 
products liability cause of action involving a non-commercial vessel). However, 
the willingness of courts to apply the substantive maritime law to products lia-
bility claims may be suspect. Compare Shennan v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, 
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (D. Md. 1990) (distinguishing East River on its 
facts and pennitting recovery of economic losses because of the non-commer-
cial nature of the vessel), with Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver Boat Corp., No. 
CIV.A.WMN-96-194, 1997 WL 714900, *3-4 (D. Md. May 29, 1997) (observing 
that there is no distinction between a commercial or non-commercial vessel 
upon which purchase pennit a recovery). 
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The seminal case from the United States Supreme Court pro-
viding the determinative demarcation of when state law is applicable 
to an admiralty action is Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. 147 Pursuant to 
a state statute, the Workmen's Compensation Commission of New 
York awarded a decedent's spouse and surviving children a fixed 
weekly amount because his accidental death happened during the 
course of employment. 148 The Supreme Court held that the New 
York Workmen's Compensation Act attempted "to give [a remedy 
that] is of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapa-
ble of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court and is 
not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction." 149 
Observing that the saving to suitors clause allowed New York to 
only provide a " 'common law remedy where the common law 
[was] competent to give it,' "150 the Court deduced that the statuto-
rily mandated remedy was not available under the common law and 
was therefore constitutionally indefensible. 151 The Supreme Court 
concluded that any state law that "works material prejudice to the 
characteristic features of the general maritime law" is invalid. 152 Un-
til Jensen s holding is completely repudiated by the Supreme Court, 
it remains the best chart available to safely navigate the course be-
tween the reefs of conflicting state law and federal interest in 
uniformity. 153 
Notwithstanding the need for uniformity and consistency under 
admiralty law, there are three reasons to permit state law to apply to 
147. 244 U.S. 205 (1917), superseded on other grounds by 33 U.S.C. §§ 90144 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997). 
148. The widow's decedent-a stevedore-was offioading lumber from the S.S. El 
Oriente at the time of his demise. See id. at 207-08. While driving a small, elec-
trically-powered freight truck loaded with lumber, the stevedore jammed the 
lumber on the guide pieces on a gangway. See id. at 208. Reversing the truck, 
he went "at third or full speed" backwards from the gangway into the stop's 
hold, stuck his head at the top of the hatch, and died. See id. The decedent's 
employer objected to the award on various grounds, including its constitution-
ality. See id. at 209-10. 
149. See id. at 218. 
150. Id. 
151. See id. 
152. Id. at 216. 
153. Burrell, supra note 131, at 80 ("Jensen still appears to supply the only test for 
determining when the uniformity [principles in admiralty] can be sacrificed 
without producing a degree of unpredictability that damages all maritime in-
terests."). But see Robertson, supra note 105, at 89 ("Jensen has never been a 
good guide, and today is completely discredited. Anyone who places serious 
reliance on any of its teachings is as likely to be fooled as enlightened."). 
\. 
1999] East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delaval 447 
admiralty cases heard in state courts. 154 First, state law may fill a gap 
left by inadequate federal statutes or in the general maritime law. 155 
Where clear federal guidance is absent, state courts are free to fash-
ion their own rule. 156 Second, in certain actions, local interests may 
predominate. ls7 Third, state law rights or remedies may be applied 
154. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 63. 
155. See id. ("No body of law provides a rule for every conceivable situation."). 
156. See id. at 64 (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 
(1955». In Wilburn Boat Co., a recreational vessel caught fire while it was used 
in violation of an insurance policy on an artificial lake, Lake Texahoma, situ-
ated between Texas and Oklahoma. See Wilburn Boat Co., 348 U.S. at 31l. The 
Wilburn Boat Co. Court decided to "leave the regulation of marine insurance 
where it has been-with the States" rather than to fashion a judicial rule as 
part of the general maritime law. fd. at 32l. In dissent, Justice Reed wrote: 
It is not only in markings, lights, signals, and navigation that States 
are barred from legislation interfering with maritime operation. The 
need for a uniform rule is just as great when dealing with the effect 
to be given to marine insurance on boats which plough our naviga-
ble waters. A vessel moves from State to State along our coasts or riv-
ers. State lines may run with the channel or across it. Under mari-
time custom an insurance policy usually covers the vessel wherever it 
may go. If uniformity is needed anywhere, it is needed in marine in-
surance. It is like the question of seaworthiness which must be con-
trolled by one law. 
fd. at 333 (Reed, J., dissenting). Despite criticism from admiralty law scholars 
for offending admiralty uniformity principles, Wilburn Boat Co. has never been 
abrogated. See 1 PARKS, at supra note 7, at 13 ("Wilburn cast the law of marine 
insurance into a state of turmoil."); see also LESUE J. BURGESS. MARINE INSUR. 
ANCE AND GENERAL AVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 34-36 (3d ed. 1991) (observ-
ingthat Wilburn Boat Co. is "widely criticized"). 
157. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 64; see also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City 
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960) (observing that the city of Detroit could 
enforce a criminal ordinance prohibiting a steamship's smoke stacks from 
emitting black smoke on vessels that were approved and licensed by the fed-
eral government to operate in interstate commerce). In Huron Portland Cement 
Co., the Supreme Court acknowledged that local interests of a port city could 
affect marine navigation and commerce, ordinarily federal interests. See id. 
("The mere possession of a federal license, however, does not immunize a 
ship from the normal incidents of local police power, not constituting a direct 
regulation of commerce."). Furthermore, "the local regulation of wharves and 
docks" is a permissible local interest. fd. (citing Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 
U.S. 559 (1881». Yet, there is a fine line drawn here; for example, federally 
licensed vessels are exempt from local quarantine laws and local pilotage laws. 
See id. (citing Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Board of 
Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadel-
phia, 53 U.S. (How.) 299 (1851). The dissenters in Huron Portland Cement Co. 
opined: "If local law required federally licensed vessels to observe local speed 
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in cases where there is a need to supplement eXIstmg mantIme 
law. ISS However, as one commentator stated: "The 'supplemental' 
use of state law is most damaging to uniformity and its attendant 
value of predictability." IS9 A court's use of state law to supply a rem-
edy in a hard case, such as when a child is killed in a maritime acci-
dentl60 or when a swimmer is injured by a recreational vessel's pro-
pellers,161 and where the remedy in admiralty is not as attractive as 
that available under state law, could better be termed circumnaviga-
tion rather than supplementation. 162 
Although the underlying policies of admiralty are clear, the 
unapplicable law may vary from case to case. With its emphasis on 
commercial trade and predictability, admiralty law shares very little 
with the policy underpinnings of state common or statutory law; 
therefore, the substantive remedies may vary drastically between ad-
miralty and state law. Yet, before addressing the schism separating 
state law and admiralty law on the recovery of purely economic 
losses in a tort action, the practitioner must address the fundamen-
tal procedural issue of what court in which to file an admiralty 
claim. The answer to this question is not trivial-the questions of 
how "predominant" a state's interests are, how "clear" the general 
maritime law is, and how "necessary" state law supplementation of 
admiralty law is may hinge on who evaluates the competing federal 
and local interests. 
IV. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE MARITIME 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM 
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction in General 
With such a large number of recreational vessels registered in 
laws, obey local traffic regulations, or dock at certain times or under pre-
scribed conditions, we would have local laws not at war with the federal li-
cense, but complementary to it.~ Id. at 451 (Douglas, j., dissenting). The dis-
senting Justices further observed: 
However the issue in the present case is stated it comes down to 
making criminal in the Port of Detroit the use of a certificate issued 
under paramount federal law .... Never before, I believe, have we 
recognized the right of local law to make the use of an unquestiona-
bly legal federal license a criminal offense. 
[d. at 454 (Douglas, j., dissenting). 
158. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 63, 78-80. 
159. [d. at 79. 
160. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
161. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
162. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 80. 
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Maryland,163 practitioners may face the task of bringing or defend-
ing against a potential maritime claim. l64 Admiralty actions have sev-
eral markedly different features that set them apart from the typical 
state court action. Not only is there unique nautical language used 
by both commercial mariners and recreational sailors,165 but the 
maritime claim will have different rules of decision and proce-
dure. l66 There are also unique jurisdictional considerations that ap-
ply to a maritime dispute. 167 Moreover, federalism concerns may 
163. In 1996, there were 194,266 motorboats registered in Maryland. See U.S. DEP'T 
OF TRANSP., supra note 1, at 21; see also 46 U.S.C. §§ 12,301'{)9 (1987) (address-
ing the numbering of undocumented vessels). This number does not include 
"documented yachts," which are vessels not registered by Maryland authori-
ties, but enrolled as vessels under federal statutes. See 46 U.S.C. § 12,102 
(documenting vessels "of at least 5 net tons that is not registered under the 
laws of a foreign country is' eligible for documentation" if the owner meets 
certain criteria). 
164. See 8 BENEDICf, supra note 23, at xiv ("With the general decline of commercial 
shipping throughout the world and the dramatic increase in recreational 
boating ... admiralty law is no longer the exclusive domain of 'old salt sea 
lawyers' practicing in the august halls of various United States District Courts 
throughout the land."). For practical guidance on the most common situa-
tions involving recreational vessels,' see WARREN J. MARWEDEL ET AL .. RECREA· 
TIONAL CRAFT: JURISDICTION, CLAIMS & COVERAGE (1990). 
165. For a useful primer of maritime subjects and nautical terms for an attorney 
facing a recreational vessel claim, see CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 1-28; 8 BENE-
DICf, supra note 23, at App. Naut-l. 
166. For example, absent explicit federal statutory authority to the contrary, there 
is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an admiralty action tried in a fed-
eral court. See T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Drydocks, Inc., 
702 F.2d 585, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1983); 9 WRIGHT. ET AL. supra note 27, § 2315, at 
116. This may not be the case if the maritime claim is brought in a state 
court. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 705 ("[T]he thought is that in the sub-
stantive realm there is some room for state law supplementation of the fed-
eral maritime law, whereas in the procedural realm, the state courts are free 
to go their own way."). Although the substantive law to determine parties' 
rights and liabilities is the same whether in the federal or state forum, a plain-
tiff who elects to proceed in state court may exercise a right to a jury trial. See 
Midland Enter. v. Brasher, 886 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1989) ("One of the rem-
edies saved to suitors was the right to trial by jury .... "). In the Fourth Cir-
cuit, juries may even hear claims against different parties on admiralty and 
non-admiralty grounds, each having a different subject-matter jurisdictional 
basis but brought together in one suit. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 
71 F.3d 148, 151-54 & nn.5,6 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing an action where sev-
eral defendants were sued under negligence and products liability theories, 
but where the plaintiff relied upon diversity jurisdiction to reach one defend-
ant and admiralty jurisdiction to reach the co-defendant). 
167. See infra Part N.B. 
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limit or even forestall a remedy in favor of admiralty uniformity 
principles. 168 
B. Procedural Aspects of a Maritime Products Liability Claim 
Regardless of whether a state or federal court hears a dispute 
arising out of a defective recreational vessel or its component parts, 
admiralty jurisdiction must be initially pleaded in accordance with 
the court's rules of procedure. 169 The particular pleading require-
ments of different jurisdictions are "neither numerous or difficult 
but do require attention" if practitioners intend to invoke admiralty 
jurisdiction. 17o Even if properly. pleaded, not all of Maryland's state 
territorial waters171 will provide· the necessary situs for admiralty tort 
168. See infra notes 22941 and accompanying text. 
169. See T.N. T. Marine Scrv. Inc., 702 F.2d at 587-88 (discussing the pleading require-
ments of Rule 9(h) and the consequences of improperly pleading under the 
rule). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) provides in relevant part: 
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiCtion that is also within the jurisdiction of 
the district court on some other ground may contain a statement 
identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the pur-
poses of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82,and the Supplemental Rules for Cer-
tain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. If the claim is cognizable only 
in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes 
whether so identified or not. The amendment of a pleading to add 
or withdraw an identifying statement is governed by the principles of 
Rule 15. A case that includes an admiralty or maritime claim within 
this subdivision is an admiralty case within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (3). 
FED. R CN. P. 9(h). But see MD. RULE 2-303(b) ("Each averment of a pleading 
shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleadings are re-
quired."). 
170. 8 BENEDlcr, supra note 23, § 2.01 [B], at 2-3. 
171. State territorial waters exclusively navigable by recreational vessels may provide 
the necessary situs required for extending admiralty tort jurisdiction. See Fore-
most Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982); Mullenix v. United 
States, 984 F.2d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1993). But see 33 U.S.C. § 59 (1986) (declar-
ing that the northwest branch of the Patapsco River to be non-navigable); 33 
U.S.C. § 59k (1986) (declaring that the south prong of the Wicomico River to 
be non-navigable). Whether a privately-owned lake such as Deep Creek Lake 
will provide the necessary situs element required for admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion is an open question that has not been specifically adjudicated. However, 
at least one court has found that admiralty tort jurisdiction may not be 
proper where a man-made lake is without present navigability in fact. See 
Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F.3d 1247,1253(3d Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that a man-made, land-locked lake was non-navigable for federal jurisdic-
tion purposes). 
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jurisdiction172 nor do all disputes involving boats and watercraft nec-
essarily invoke admiralty jurisdiction. 173 
However, in establishing admiralty jurisdiction, there is little 
discrimination between vessel types174 or between commercial and 
non-commercial vessels. 175 Admiralty jurisdiction of the federal 
courts has been established for a jet ski 176 and other small craft,177 as 
well as super tankers;178 ultimately, the size or use of a vessel is not 
172. The United States Supreme Court has decided that an admiralty tort claim 
arising out of a collision between two recreational vessels on a state's territo-
rial waters can properly be within federal admiralty jurisdiction so long as the 
tort claim bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See 
Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-77. 
173. For the court to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, several pre-
requisites are necessary. In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 
Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995), the Supreme Court held that to properly obtain ad-
miralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the tort must have (1) occurred on navi-
gable waters, and (2) the underlying facts of the incident must bear a substan-
tial relationship to traditional maritime activity, and (3) have a potential 
impact on maritime commerce. See id. at 532-34. 
174. A variety of floating objects with differing sizes, purposes, and styles are de-
fined as vessels. See 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1994) ("The word 'vessel' includes every 
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of be-
ing used, as a means of transportation on the water."). Several other federal 
statutes define vessels somewhat differently for various purposes and produce 
varying results. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-6 (explaining the difficulty 
of defining what is a "vessel"). A seaplane taxiing on the water is considered a 
vessel for the purposes of collision regulations, but is not a vessel while in the 
air. Compare 33 U.S.C. §§ 2003(e), 2018(d) (1994), with 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.113, 
91.115 (1998). 
175. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 675 (explaining that when determining the ex-
istence of admiralty jurisdiction, the courts should not distinguish between 
vessel types based solely on whether they are for commercial or pleasure use). 
176. A jet ski is described as: 
a small, low profile, motorized vessel-seven feet long, two feet high, 
and two feet wide--designed with a narrow beam to enhance its ma-
neuverability. It is designed to be driven at speeds of up to 35 m.p.h. 
with the operator in a standing or kneeling position; balance is re-
quired to operate it. 
Martell v. Boardwalk Enter., 748 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir. 1984) (addressing a 
boating accident on Lake George in northern New York where the operator 
of a recreational boat struck a rented jet ski driven by a teenager). 
177. See Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying ad-
miralty law to a case involving a seven-foot jet ski); Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 
575, 576 (6th Cir. 1937) (applying admiralty law to a case involving a 15-foot 
Chris-Craft motorboat). 
178. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 859-60 
(1986). 
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relevant to establishing admiralty jurisdiction, so long as the claim 
involves a vessel. I79 The nature of the underlying claim dictates 
proper subject matter jurisdiction, as there are different jurisdic-
tional requirements for admiralty tort claims and maritime contract 
actions. ISO 
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Admiralty Tort Claims 
For the Maryland court to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a 
tort claim, several prerequisites must be met. lSI In Jerome B. Grubart, 
Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock CO.,IS2 the United States Supreme 
Court refined their holdings from an earlier trilogy of maritime 
cases to set forth specific requirements. IS3 There, a contractor 
sought to limit liability for damages resulting from the flooding of a 
179. See Provost v. Huber, 594 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1979). The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of ad-
miralty jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff asserted "that the tractor-
trailer being used to carry [a house over the frozen surface of a lake] was a 
vessel within the meaning of maritime law because it was transporting the 
structure over water." Id. Before completing the trek across the lake, the trac-
tor trailer broke through the ice and the house eventually sunk to the bottom 
of Lake Superior. See ill. The court concluded that "[b]y no stretch of the im-
agination can we equate a multi-wheeled device, designed and built for the 
purpose of transportation over a hard, defined surface-such as roads, high-
ways, and even ice-with a vessel or ship as those terms are used in maritime 
law." Ill. 
180. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 690-93; Marwedel, supra note 44, at 426-47. But 
see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, §§ 1-10, & 57 n.13 (discussing the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites for admiralty and observing that products liability cases in 
admiralty have eroded this doctrine). 
181. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. 
182. 513 U.S. 527 (1995). . 
183. See id. at 532-33 (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363, 365-67 (1990); Fore-
most Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982); Executive Jet Avia-
tion, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 260 (1972». The Grubart Court 
observed that the traditional inquiry used by courts to examine whether a 
claim fell under admiralty law was simple: if the tort occurred on navigable 
waters, then admiralty jurisdiction was applied. See id. at 531. IT the wrong did 
not happen while on navigable waters, then admiralty jurisdiction could not 
be applied. See ill. at 531-32. 
In 1948, the United States Congress enacted the Extension of Admiralty Ju-
risdiction Act, now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994), to "end concern over 
the sometimes confusing line between land and water, by investing admiralty 
with jurisdiction over 'all cases' where the injury was caused by a ship or 
other vessel on navigable water, even if such injury occurred on land." Jerome 
B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 532 (citing Gutierrez v. Waterman 8.S. Corp., 373 
U.S. 206, 209-10 (1963); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 260. 
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freight tunnel that purportedly resulted from the contractor's negli-
gent weakening of the tunnel structure while driving pilings into 
the riverbed. l84 The Supreme Court held that to properly obtain ad-
miralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, the tort must (1) have oc-
curred on navigable waters,185 and (2) involve underlying facts that 
bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity186 that 
has the potential to materially impact maritime commerce. 187 
The first prong of the Grubart jurisdictional test, the situs/loca-
tion element,188 requires that the tort occur on navigable waters un-
184. SeeJerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 529-30. 
185. "Navigable waters" are defined as "not only ... the main sea, but ... all the 
navigable waters of the United States ... whether landlocked or open, salt or 
fresh, tide or no tide." Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 25 
(1870). However, it should be noted that the definition of "navigability" in 
some federal contexts does not necessarily bind a determination of navigabil-
ity under admiralty law. See 33 U.S.C.S. § 1362(7) (1986)(defining navigability 
for the Clean Water Act). There is an additional factor: the water must be 
presently navigable in fact. See Mullenix v. United States, 984 F.2d 101, 104-05 
(4th Cir. 1993). In Mullinex, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit overruled the trial court's holding that the waters of the Poto-
mac River above dam number five were beyond the reach of admiralty tort ju-
risdiction. See id. at 105. The court's rationale was based on the fact that the 
Potomac River had substantial commercial interstate ferry traffic, which made 
the river "navigable in fact" for the purposes of admiralty subject-matter juris-
diction. See id. at 104 & n.3. But see LeBlanc v. City of Cleveland, 979 F. Supp. 
142, 14546 (N.D.N.Y 1997) (dismissing a claim for personal injuries sustained 
from a collision between a kayak and recreational vessel for lack of admiralty 
jurisdiction because the waterway was not navigable in fact). In LeBlanc, the 
court held that the Hudson River area where the accident occurred was not 
navigable in fact because of man-made dams and natural obstructions and 
therefore did not satisfy the situs element required to sustain admiralty tort 
jurisdiction. See id. at 146. 
However, there is no requirement that the body of water be natural-a navi-
gable waterway can be artificially created. In Ex Parte Buyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632 
(1884), the Supreme Court held that admiralty jurisdiction extended to the Il-
linois and Michigan canal, which is an artificial but "navigable waterway con-
necting Lake Michigan and the Chicago River with the Illinois [R] iver and 
the Mississippi [R] iver." Id. at 631. 
186. SeeJerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 527 (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 
363-64 n.2 (1990». 
187. See id. at 533 (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 
(1982». 
188. See id. at 533 (citing Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 
268 (1972) (affixing a nexus test onto the requirement that the tort must 
have occurred on navigable waters for admiralty jurisdiction to attach». 
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less extended by the authority of the Extension of Admiralty Act. 189 
As a matter of law, the definition of navigable waters must be deter-
mined by the federal courts or Congress. l90 Therefore, state laws or 
state court holdings are not determinative of navigability for the 
purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. 191 Waterways are considered navi-
gable if " 'they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their 
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade 
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of 
trade and travel on water.' "192 Despite admiralty's historical empha-
sis on maritime commerce, the Court specifically noted that "a 
purely recreational waterway can be navigable for admiralty 
purposes." 193 
The second prong of the Grubart test contains two elements for 
determining whether admiralty tort jurisdiction can be extended 
over an alleged maritime tort. The Supreme Court mandated that 
the facts presented have " 'a potentially disruptive impact on mari-
time commerce' "194 and a substantial connection to traditional mar-
itime activity.195 The first element of the second prong is met when 
189. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994). 
190. See 14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3671 (discussing the source and scope 
of the jurisdiction of federal courts in admiralty matter). See also supra note 
185. 
191. See Pugent Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 
644 F.2d 785, 788 (1981) (citing Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 
260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922); Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 214 F.2d 334, 
336-37 (7th Cir. 1954». 
192. Mullenix v. United States, 984 F.2d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting The 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870». 
193. Id. 
194. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 527 (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 
364 n.2 (1990». 
195. Id. at 533. This element is a distillation of three separate admiralty holdings. 
See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367 (holding that a fire on a yacht berthed at a marina 
generated a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity); Foremost Ins. 
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982) (holding that a collision of two 
recreational vessels on navigable waters was within admiralty jurisdiction); Ex-
ecutive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972) (holding 
that an alleged wrong must bear a significant relationship to traditional mari-
time activity). Executive Jet involved tort claims stemming from an aborted 
take-off of an aircraft that crashed into the navigable waters of Lake Erie. See 
id. at 250. Based upon "judicial, legislative, and scholarly recognition" that "a 
purely mechanical application of the locality test" was problematic in deter-
mining whether admiralty jurisdiction was proper, the Executive Jet Court con-
cluded that "maritime locality alone is not a sufficient predicate .... " Id. at 
261. The Supreme Court then fashioned a nexus test, requiring that "the 
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the allegedly tortious incident, described "at an intermediate level 
of possible generality,"196 can adversely affect maritime commerce, 
especially where vessel navigation or maritime operations could be 
impeded. 197 The latter element of the second prong of the Grubart 
inquiry turns on whether the conduct at issue, regardless of 
whether commercial or noncommercial in nature, "is so closely re-
lated to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the rea-
sons for applying special admiralty rules would apply .... " 198 
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that torts 
on or involving recreational vessels should fall outside admiralty ju-
risdiction. l99 The Court concluded that such a distinction would be 
offensive to the principle of admiralty uniformity.2°O Although the 
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. at 
268. 
Foremost Insurance Co. was the second case in this trilogy. Focusing on the ap-
plicable law for a collision between an eighteen-foot pleasure craft and a six-
teen-foot recreational fishing vessel on the Amite River in Louisiana, see Fare-
most Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 678, the Supreme Court held that "a collision 
between two vessels on navigable waters properly states a claim within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 677. In dissent, Justice Powell 
opined that "there is no substantial federal interest that justifies a rule ex-
tending admiralty jurisdiction to the edge of absurdity." Id. at 678 (Powell, j., 
dissenting). Noting that "[t]his case only involves pleasure craft," Justice Pow-
ell concluded that there was "no connection with any historic federal admi-
ralty interest." Id. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
In the third case of the trilogy, Sisson v. Ruby, the Court extended admiralty 
law to a dispute arising from a fire aboard a yacht and explained that the 
"relevant 'activity' is defined not by the particular· circumstances of the inci-
dent, but by the general conduct from which the incident arose." Sisson, 497 
U.S. at, 364. Maintaining that the Foremost Insurance Co. holding should not be 
restrictively read, the Sisson Court explained that navigation was merely one 
example of the types of traditional maritime activities that could satisfy the 
nexus element of the jurisdictional test elucidated in Executive Jet. See id. at 
365. The Supreme Court observed that "navigation, storing and maintaining a 
vessel at a marina on a navigable waterway is substantially related to tradi-
tional maritime activity." Id. at 367. Although urged by Justice Scalia to aban-
don the potentiality requirement altogether, the Sisson Court declined. See id. 
at 364 n.2. The Sisson Court also explicitly declined to adopt any of the more 
formulaic approaches then used by the federal circuits. See id. at 367 n.4. 
196. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 538. 
197. See id. at 539. 
198. Id. 
199. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367. 
200. See id. The Sisson Court further opined: "The need for uniform rules of mari-
time conduct and liability is not limited to navigation, but extends at least to 
any other activities traditionally undertaken by vessels, commercial or non-
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primary purpose of admiralty is to protect mantIme commerce,2°l 
recreational vessels operate co-extensively with commercial vessels 
on navigable waters under unifonn navigation rules.202 Thus, plea-
sure craft torts have the capacity to endanger commercial ship-
ping,203 which is within the federal interest.204 
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Maritime Contract Claims 
A maritime contract claim lies within admiralty jurisdiction if it 
meets judicially mandated subject-matter prerequisites. The Su-
preme Court held that detennining whether admiralty jurisdiction 
should be extended over a contract dispute is based on the court's 
inquiry as to: 
whether the contract was or was not a maritime contract. 
If it was, [admiralty] jurisdiction was asserted; if it was not, 
the jurisdiction was denied. And whether [the contract] was 
maritime or not maritime depended, not on the place 
where the contract was made, but on the subject-matter of 
the contract. If that was maritime the contract was 
maritime.205 
Therefore, the applicability of admiralty principles to a contract 
depend on the court's characterization of the work to be perfonned 
pursuant to the agreement. Contracts that concern the charter of a 
ship,206 shipping cargo by a vessel,207 wharfage or dock rental for a 
commercial." Id. 
201. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674 ("[T]he primary focus of admiralty juris-
diction is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce .... "). 
202. See id. at 676. (" [T]he federal [collision regulations also known as the nauti-
cal] 'Rules of the Road,' [are] designed for preventing collisions on navigable 
waters . . . [and] apply to all vessels without regard to their commercial or 
noncommercial nature."). 
203. SeeJerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 538-39. 
204. See Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674-75 ("The federal interest in protecting 
maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction is 
restricted to those individuals actually engaged in commercial maritime activ-
ity."). 
205. New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 29 
(1870). See generally Marwedal, supra note 44, at 448 (indicating that admiralty 
contract jurisdiction applies to contracts relating "to the navigation, business, 
or commerce of the sea"); Robertson, supra note 82, at 694-98 (discussing the 
types of maritime contracts that fall within admiralty contract jurisdiction); 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-10 (discussing admiralty contract jurisdiction); 
14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3675. 
206. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
1999] East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delaval 457 
vessel,208 the towage of other vessels209 or a flotilla of barges,210 the 
salvage of a sunken vessel,2l1 and the delivery of the ship's fueP12 
have all been considered maritime contracts by the courts.2J3 How-
ever, a contract for the sale of a vessel214 or the building of aves-
seP15 is not considered a maritime contract,216 but a contract for re-
207. See Morewood v. Enequist, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 491,493-94 (1859). The Supreme 
Court "decided that chaiter-parties and contracts of affreightment are 'mari-
time contracts' within the true meaning and construction of the Constitution 
and act of Congress, and cognizable in courts of admiralty .... " Id. 
208. Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Md. 1966) 
("Dock or wharf accommodations are a necessity of navigation, ... and 
claims arising out of contracts with respect thereto have been held to be 
within the admiralty jurisdiction.") (citations omitted). 
209. See The Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 643 (1900) ("That a 
contract to tow another vessel is a maritime contract is too clear for argu-
ment, and there is no distinction in principle between a vessel and a [towed 
vessel].") . 
210. See generally, e.g., Cross Contracting Co. v. Law, 454 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1972) .. 
211. See Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 
561 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the salvage of the S.S. Central America while re-
turning from California with over a then-valued $1,000,000 in gold cargo on 
board). 
212. See Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 155, 161 (1989), a/I'd, 
904 F.2d 33, reu'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 603 (1991) (addressing the dispute 
over an agency contract for fueling the M/V Green Harbour, a large cargo 
ship). 
213. See ScHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-10, at 59-63. 
214. See Flota Martima Browning de Cuba v. Snobel, 363 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir. 
1966). The court observed: "Although subjected to ... criticism, the prevail-
ing rule has been that a contract for the sale of a ship is not a maritime con-
tract." Id. at 735 (citing the criticism by GILMORE & BlACK, supra note 24, § 1-4 
and Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Ship-8ale Contracts, 6 STAN. L. REv. 540, 545-
46 (1954». 
215. Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 853 F.2d 848, 850 (lIth Cir. 1988) 
("Until a vessel is completed and launched it does not become a ship in the 
legal sense, and therefore admiralty jurisdiction does not exist.") (citing 
North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119, 
127 (1918». 
216. See Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242, 243 (1920) 
("Under decisions of this court the settled rule is that a contract for the com-
plete construction of a ship ... is non-maritime, and not within the admiralty 
jurisdiction.") (citing North Pac. S.S. Co., 249 U.S. at 125; The Winnebago, 205 
U.S. 354, 363 (1907); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874); Roach 
v. Chapman, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 129 (1859); People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 
U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857»; see also Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 242, 245 (D. Md. 1942) ("It is well settled in this country that 
the work of building a ship is not a maritime contract even though the ship 
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pairs217 may be held to be one, depending on the facts of the 
case.218 Moreover, a contract that is for the repair of a boat, but is 
so extensive as to be a total rebuilding of a vessel, arguably may not 
be a maritime contract.219 
3. The Similarity Between the Jurisdictional Requirements for Ad-
miralty Tort and Contract Claims 
There is some common ground between the jurisdictional re-
quirements for tort claims and contract claims under admiralty law. 
Regardless of whether a maritime claim arises in tort or contract, a 
claim may fall under admiralty law without regard to jurisdictional 
amount220 or diversity of the parties.221 However, if the parties are 
diverse and the jurisdictional amount is met,222 a case involving mar-
itime matters may be heard on the civil law side of the federal 
docket.223 Federal question jurisdiction can also be asserted in mari- . 
time matters224, but admiralty jurisdiction itself is not a federal ques- . 
tion.225 Moreover, an action with non-admiralty claims,226 which be-
longs on the civil law side of the federal docket, may be properly 
may have been launched."). 
217. See Robert E. Blake, Inc. v. Excel Envtl., 104 F.3d 1158, 1160 (1997) 
("[G]enerally ... a contract to repair a ship is governed by admiralty law 
while a contract to build a ship is not."). 
218. See id. at 1160-62 (concluding that a ship repair contract fell outside the defi-
nition of a maritime contract because the ship had been indefinitely with-
drawn from navigation). . 
219. Id. (applying the dead ship doctrine to an contract claim in admiralty). 
220. See Robert E. Blake, Inc., 104 F.3d at 1160-62. 
221. See 14A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 3676, at 414 ("[I]n a suit brought 
under the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district courts, neither com-
plete diversity of citizenship nor a minimum jurisdictional amount in contro-
versy is required."). 
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1994). The amount in controversy must be at least 
$75,000. See id. 
223. See 5 WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 1211. 
224. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); see also WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 27, § 1014. 
225. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 
U.S. 19, 33 (1990). 
226. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Fed-
eral courts are authorized, in one civil action, to exercise several types of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction historically exercised by separate courts, including 
courts of law, equity, and admiralty."). The Vodusek court further observed: 
"As a result, a single federal court has at least three separate departments-
law, equity, and admiralty--each of which has its own traditional procedures." 
Id. 
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heard with pendant federal claims cognizable only in admiralty.227 In 
addition, supplemental state law claims can be heard in an admi-
ralty action as long as they stem from a "common nucleus of opera-
tive fact. "228 
4. Venue and Other Considerations 
Once subject matter jurisdiction is established, the next logical 
question is in what court the action should be brought. The plain-
tiff in a marine products liability case has complete discretion to 
choose the forum in which the claim will be heard.229 Current rules 
of procedure essentially allow "forum shopping,"230 because the 
maritime plaintiff can choose to file a claim in the federal court sit-
ting in admiralty, on the civil law side of federal court, or in a state 
court.23I Another advantage that inures to the plaintiff filing a claim 
in admiralty, as opposed to a common law dispute filed in federal 
court, is that the normal federal venue rules232 are inapplicable.233 It 
was decided more than a century ago that admiralty proceedings 
are not considered civil actions within the meaning of the federal 
statutes pertaining to venue.234 Moreover, in admiralty cases, Mary-
land's "state courts ... are not bound by the venue requirements 
[and] they are not bound by the federal common law venue 
rule . . . of forum non conveniens. "235 However, if the suit is filed in 
227. See The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555,560 (1866) ("[WJhen parties go 
into the Federal courts, they must show by the pleadings certain facts to give 
the court jurisdiction."); see also FED. R CIV. P. 9(h) (requiring admiralty juris-
diction to be specifically pled). 
228. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see Motts 
v. M/V Green Wave, 25 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776 (S.D. Tex. 1998). But see Lewis v. 
United States, 812 F. Supp. 620, 624 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
229. See 15 WRIGHT. ET AL., supra note 27, at § 3848; see also CAliFORNIA PLEAsURE 
BOATING LAw. supra note 136, at 226 ("The attorney dealing with small boat 
litigation has considerable discretion in choosing among a competent state 
court, the civil side of a federal district court, and the admiralty side of fed-
eral district court."). 
230. The phrase "forum shopping" was coined by Judge J. Skelly Wright of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Gita F. 
Rothschild, Forum Shopping, 24 LmG., Spring 1998, at 40, 4041. 
231. See supra note 230. 
232. See generaUy 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1413 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
233. In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The regu-
lar venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-93 are inapplicable in admiralty 
cases."); see also 15 WRIGHT. ET AL., supra note 27, § 3817. 
234. See 15 WRIGHT. ET AL., supra note 27, § 3817; see also infra note 235 and accom-
panying text. 
235. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (holding that the 
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state court or is docketed on the civil law side of the federal court, 
then the venue rules ordinarily applicable to plaintiffs will govern.236 
Even with this flexibility, many plaintiffs prefer to file in federal 
court for reasons such as judges with diverse experience,237 a larger 
and more diverse jury pool,238 and more efficient case handling with 
quicker results. 239 
Despite the advantages of federal court, there is a significant 
number of plaintiffs that choose to file in state court.240 Although 
many claims entailing the loss of a pleasure craft caused by a defec-
tive marine product are customarily brought in the federal district 
court rather than in a state court under the saving-to-suitors 
clause, the substantive application of the general maritime law 
should not differ. 241 While the underlying principles of consistency 
and uniformity that are essential to admiralty law are clear, these 
principals have increasingly faltered in the arena of marine prod-
ucts liability actions, especially as they result in recovery of eco-
nomic losses. 
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN 
ADMIRALTY 
The character of marine product liability claims has had the at-
tention of the admiralty bar ever since Judge Benjamin Cardozo 
changed the face of tort law242 with his seminal majority opinion in 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable in admiralty). 
236. See id. at 454 (noting that state courts, even when hearing an admiralty case, 
are not bound by the federal venue statutes). 
237. See Rothschild, supra note 229, at 44 ("Some lawyers believe that an Article III 
appointment, providing life tenure and a salary which can't be reduced, at-
tracts higher-quality judges.") (citing Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Fmum 
Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. 
U. L. REv. 369, 400 (1992». 
238. See id. ("The jury pool may differ between state and federal courts."). In Ma-
ryland, the circuit court jury pool is drawn from the county or city populace, 
whereas in federal court the jury pool is drawn from the whole state. Compare 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 8-102(a), 8-104 (1995), with 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1861-78 (1994). See also RONALD M. CHERRY & FRANK F. DAILY, CML TRIAL PRO-
CEDURES IN MARYLAND 20 (MICPEL 1995) (discussing tactical considerations for 
selection of the Maryland federal or state forum). 
239. See Rothschild, supra note 230, at 41. 
240. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 686-87 (discussing the increasing numbers of 
admiralty cases heard in state courts). 
241. See id. 
242. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, HISTORIC U.S. COURT CAsES 1690-1990: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
297-300 (1992) (describing MacPherson as the origin of consumer rights in 
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.,243 which abolished the contractual 
privity requirement in favor of strict liability for an unreasonably 
dangerous product.244 Other jurisdictions,245 including Maryland,246 
followed the lead of the Court of Appeals of New York and recog-
nized strict liability as a distinct cause of action.247 Marine products 
tort law). 
243. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See 2 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1064 & n.63 ("It ap-
pears that the first maritime case to follow MacPherson as to the liability of a 
remote shipbuilder was Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co." (citing Sieracki v. Seas 
Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), rev'd in part and afl'd in part on other 
grounds, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), superseded by statute as noted by Edmonds v. Compa-
gnie Generale Transatiantique, 443 U.S. 256,262 & n.11 (1979»). In Sieracki, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that "if [a 
seaman] is injured on the ship in the course of unloading or loading [a] ves-
sel he may have redress for a defect caused by its unseaworthiness." Sieracki, 
149 F.2d at 102; see also Dennis W. Nixon, Products Liability and Pleasure Boats, 
29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 243, 247 (1998) (As is well-known, MacPherson went to 
sea in 1945 in Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co.). 
244. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. Speaking for the majority, Judge Cardozo 
explained: 
[d. 
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and 
limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows 
out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obli-
gation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law. 
245. See gmerally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citade~ 69 YALE LJ. 1099, 
1100 .. 03 (1960) (chronicling the effect of MacPherson). 
246. Even though Maryland appellate cases quoted MacPherson with approval or dis-
tinguished its tenets, Maryland's high court never expressly adopted the rea-
soning of MacPherson until 1951. In Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md. 585, 84 
A.2d 876 (1951), the court of appeals recognized MacPherson: "[W]e shall as-
sume that MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company and the cases which anticipated 
or followed it are law in Maryland." [d. at 599, 84 A.2d at 882. For a historical 
and legal analysis by the Maryland court of special appeals examining strict li-
ability in tort for a defective product, see Valk Mfg. Co.. v. &ngasway, 74 Md. 
App. 304, 310-23, 537 A.2d 622, 626-32 (1988), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds 
Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989). 
247. See Robert A. Awsumb, Comment, Recovery of Economic Loss Under Section 402A, 
91- PROD .. LIAB. 1 (1986) (noting that there are essentially five different theo-
ries of recovery for a products liability claim). A litigant can press for recovery 
in an action sounding in negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability and/or fitness for its intended use, mis-
representation, or strict liability in tort. See id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-315 
(providing express and implied warranties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402B (1965) (covering negligent misrepresentation); Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (addressing strict liability in tort); 
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1050 (dealing with negligence» .. 
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liability claims are tort claims,248 sounding in strict liability and neg-
ligence.249 The law of warranty may also playa significant role in the 
adjudication of disputes arising in maritime law. Where contractual 
privity is present, a breach of an express250 or implied25J warranty in 
a shipbuilding or repair contract mayor may not be actionable in 
tort,252 but may instead give rise to an action in contract.253 This dis-
Under strict liability in tort, there are three theories under. which a court 
may impose liability for an unreasonably dangerous product. As summarized 
by the court of special appeals in Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md. 
App. 199, 527 A.2d 1337 (1987), they are defective manufacture, defective de-
sign, and failure to warn. See id. (citing Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 
Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985) (concerning a defective design theory to re-
cover for injuries incurred when a pair of pajamas caught fire); Eaton Corp. v. 
Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977) (addressing a manufacturing defect 
in a portable propane bottlc); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 
101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985) (grappling with insufficient warning of risk of in-
jury); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 
(1979) (examining a manufacturing defect of van roof), rro'd on other grounds, 
286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980». 
248. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865-66 
(1986) (adopting products liability as a maritime tort); see also John Minor 
Wisdom, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Products Liability: Economic Loss, 62 TuL. L. 
REv. 325, 325 (1988) ("Products liability is strict liability in tort unfettered by 
notions of contractual warranty."); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 3-11. 
249. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 865 ("We join the Courts of Appeals in 
recognizing products liability, including strict liability, as part of the general 
maritime law.") The Supreme Court also observed: "And to the extent that 
products actions are based on negligence, they are grounded in principles al-
ready incorporated into the general maritime law." [d. at 866 (citing 
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959». 
250. See MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw I § 2-313 (1995). This section provides in per-
tinent part: 
[d. 
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: [a]ny affirma-
tion of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates 
to the goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation 
or promise. 
251. See id. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (pertaining to the implied warranty of merchantability 
and the implied warranty of fitness for particular use); see also Addressograph-
Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 280, 329 A.2d 28, 31 (1974) ("Privity 
of contract remains an essential ingredient . . . in a breach of express war-
ranty action not involving personal injury, because privity between the plain-
tiff and defendant is [a] requisite to maintain a contract action .... " citing 
Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 56-57 A.2d 318, 321 (1948»). 
252. See ScHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 1-11. 
253. See id. 
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tinction is crucial in a maritime products liability action so as to es-
tablish admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction.254 If contractual privity 
can be established, warranty claims fall outside of admiralty jurisdic-
tion.255 In addition, the " 'quasi-tort' theory of implied warranty is 
not well settled in maritime product liability law. "256 
The adoption of strict liability attracted many plaintiffs, includ-
ing Maryland plaintiffs,257 to seek recovery under section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.258 In addition, many maritime plain-
tiffs sought to bring actions under this new theory.259 There were 
many advantages to pleading tort claims for those that essentially 
sound in warranty,260 devoid of personal inJury or other property 
damage, as a mechanism to avoid both temporal26I and contractual 
254. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
255. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 n.7 
(1986). 
256. 8 BENEDICf, supra note 23, § 4.03[A], at 4-15. 
·257. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 278 Md. 337, 34048, 363 A.2d 955, 95%1 
(1976) (adopting section 402A); see also generaUy Gerson B. Mehlman, Recent 
Decision, 6 U. BALT. L. REv. 295, 312 (1977) (recognizing that Phipps creates 
greater accountability for those who supply and sell goods). 
258. See Wisdom, supra note 248, at 325 (discussing maritime products liability). See 
also infra note 277. 
259. See 2 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1065 n.67. Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation 
Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969) was "the first case in which an admiralty 
court squarely considered the question whether a products liability suit is cog-
nizable in admiralty." 2 PARKS, supra note 7, at 1065 n.67. The court decided 
that an action for products liability would lie in admiralty. See Schaeffer, 416 
F.2d at 221 (citing Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), 
rev'd in part and aff'd in part on other grounds, 328 U.S. 85 (1946»; Sanderlin v. 
Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1967); Noel v. United 
Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1965». Observing that history indicates 
that admiralty law (albeit slowly) incorporates the law prevailing on land 
when there is no historic or statutory principle to the contrary, the court ·per-
mitted the strict liability action to proceed. See id. 
260. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 868. The East River Court explained: 
"[T] he injury suffered-the failure of the product to function properly-is the 
essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party can seek to 
recoup the benefit of its bargain." [d. The Court also opined that: "Damage 
to a product itself is most naturally understood as a warranty claim." [d. at 
872. 
261. In Maryland, there is a three-year statute of limitations for most tort actions. 
See MD. CoDE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1995). However, the limitations 
statute begins to run only when "the claimant in fact knew or reasonably 
should have known of the wrong." Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 
431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (extending the "discovery rule" to all actions). 
There is, however, a four-year statute of limitations for actions filed under the 
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limitations.262 
Similar to the way judicially carved doctrines such as the un-
foreseeable plaintiff263 were created to limit a tortfeasor's liability, 
courts also created doctrines to limit strict liability for a defective 
product causing only economic losses.264 Many jurisdictions do not 
allow recovery in tort for a reasonably foreseeable harm that results 
in purely economic losses, absent the nexus of privity of contract or 
some other legally imposed relationship;265 otherwise, "contract law 
Maryland Vnifonn Commercial Code. See MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw I § 2-
725 (1997); see also Washington Freightliner, Inc. v. Shantytown Pier, Inc., 351 
Md. 616, 618, 719 A.2d 541, 542 (1998). 
262. See Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1209, 1226 n.65 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979). The court noted that a "seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of 
the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law." [d. (paraphras-
ing Prosser, supra note 245, at 1126). The court further stated: "Especially in 
the area of products liability, the tort theory of breach of warranty has been 
utilized to avoid the consequences of contract law with regard to privity, stat-
ute of limitations, survival of actions, and damages." [d. (citing WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 95, at 634-35 (4th ed. 1971». Par-
ties of relatively equal bargaining power may also seek to avoid the require-
ment of notice under the V.C.C. or avoid the effect of warranty disclaimers in 
shipbuilding or repair contracts, which are known as "Red Letter" clauses in 
admiralty parlance. See Howard M. McConnack, Warranties and Disclaimers, 62 
TuL. L. REv. 549, 552 (1988). 
263. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). As noted by the 
Palsgraf court: The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all, has a 
cause of action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be pro-
tected against invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor less be-
cause the act resulting in the invasion is a wrong to another far removed. [d.; 
see also JOHNSON, supra note 242, at 300·05 (discussing the unforeseeable plain-
tiff and proximate cause). 
264. See Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1195 (Del. 1992) ("The 
economic loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that prohibits recovery 
in tort where a product has damaged only itself .... n); see also Seely v. White 
Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965). The Seely court noted: 
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for 
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economiC loss is not arbi-
trary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an ac-
cident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an un-
derstanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must 
undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held 
liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to 
match a standard of safety defined in tenns of conditions that create 
unreasonable risks of hann. He cannot be held for the level of per-
fonnance of his products in the consumer's business .... 
[d. at 151. 
265. See 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PRoms §§ 3.6-3.7, 3.9 
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would drown in a sea of tort. "266 
This rule is the "economic loss rule," which in essence bars re-
covery in tort for product-related economic losses267 unless accompa-
nied by damage to property or physical injury to persons.268 Like 
the Court of Appeals of New York in MacPherson, the United States 
Supreme Court fostered product safety269 by refusing to impose the 
privity requirement in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki. 270 Instead, the 
Court explicitly relied on the fundamental maritime duty to provide 
a safe working environment and equipment on board ship so as not 
to cause personal injury.271 
Grounded in concerns over unseaworthy272 vessels, the Sieracki 
Court considered the "shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness 
as . . . essentially a species of liability without fault. "273 Thus, admi-
ralty courts imposed strict liability for personal injuries resulting 
(4th ed. 1992) (collecting cases and discussing the varying approaches of dif-
ferent jurisdictions allowing or denying a recovery for purely economic 
losses). In an admiralty context, the rule barring purely economic losses in 
tort flowed from the reasoning of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 
U.S. 303 (1927). Even though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had 
negligently treated a vessel's propeller while in dry dock, the Court explained 
that the purely economic losses of the third party owner sustained were 
barred because "as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of 
one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another, ... [t]he law does 
not spread its protection so far." Id. at 309. 
266. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) 
(citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974». 
267. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
268. See infra Part VI. 
269. See also W. KIp VISCUSI & MICHAEL J. MOORE, Rationalizing the Relationship Be-
tween Product Liability and Innovation in Tort Law and the Public Interest 106 (Pe-
ter H. Schuck ed., 1991) ("Liability should also stimulate positive product 
modifications, such as improved product warnings and incorporation of safety 
design features.") 
270. 328 U.S. 85 (1946), overruled by statute as noted by Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262 & n.ll (1979). 
271. See id. at 95. The Court held that the shipowner's duty of seaworthiness, tradi-
tionally owed to seamen, included protection for stevedores working aboard 
the ship to load cargo. See id. 
272. A noteworthy definition of unseaworthiness includes a vessel, its crew, or any 
equipment on board that is unfit for its intended use. See Waldron v. Moore-
McCormick Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1967); see also PARKS, su'pra note 
7, at 53-54. 
273. Sieracki., 328 U.S. at 94. Mter the Sieracki decision, one commentator observed 
that unseaworthiness is a species of strict liability similar to products liability 
in the sense that it is liability without regard to negligence. See SCHOENBAUM, 
supra note 37, § 3-9, at 143 n.1. 
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from the unseaworthiness of a vessel's defective equipment thirty 
years prior to . the adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts274 by the federal courts sitting in admiralty.275 The Mary-
land Court of Appeals had adopted section 402A a year earlier in 
Phipps v. General Motors Cory.276 Only a minority of the federal circuit 
courts sitting in admiralty initially embraced section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.277 This was in contravention of the trend 
of the land courts, including Maryland, even though the underlying 
policy grounds for strict liability were equally applicable to defective 
marine products.278 Most of the federal circuits sitting in admiralty 
274. Section 402A provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to li-
ability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business 
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach 
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in 
which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies al-
though (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not 
brought the product from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Awsumb, supra note 
247, at 3 ("The authors of Section 402A intended that it strike an equitable· 
balance between the manufacturer's presumed expertise and control and the 
relatively unsophisticated and unprotected status of the ordinary purchaser or 
user") (citing REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c); 2 PARKS, supra 
note 7, at 1064; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § ~. 
275. See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 
1134 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting section 402A). 
276. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); see also AJ. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 259, 634 A.2d 1330, 1337 (1994) (observing that 
"fairness requires recovery for injuries caused to person or property resulting 
from unreasonably dangerous products .... "). 
277. See supra note 273; see also Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., 565 F.2d at 1134 (adopting 
section 402A); Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 636 
(8th Cir. 1972) (adopting section 402A as "the best expression of the doctrine 
as it is generally applied"); McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577, 584 (7th 
Cir. 1965) (allowing recovery because personal injuries were caused by a de-
fect in an unreasonably dangerous recreational vessel); Wisdom, supra note 
247, at 331 (noting that a majority of courts of appeals sitting in admiralty fol-
low the rule of Santor v. A & M Karaghuesian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (NJ. 1965». 
278. See Wisdom, supra note 248, at 331 (citing Emerson C.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alas-
kan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984». See also Pan-Alaska Fisheries, 
Inc., 565 F.2d at 1134 n.2 (observing that a majority of land courts adopted 
section 402A). The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is respon-
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rejected the Restatement approach for marine products liability 
cases279 by adopting the minority approach of Santor v. A & M 
Karaghuesian, Inc. 280 
The Santor guideline was clear: a manufacturer had a duty to 
build and sell a product that was not defective, irrespective of 
whether the product's defect created an unreasonable risk of 
harm.281 In following this approach, federal courts sitting in admi-
ralty usually dealt with marine products that directly impacted the 
seafarer's livelihood or affected the mariner's safety at sea.282 The 
sive to this concern. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 21 (1998). 
279. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 869 & n.5 
(1986). But see Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibil-
ity, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1075, 1083 (1996) ("Labeling this a 'majority' ap-
proach overstates the state of the law at the time; actually, very few jurisdic-
tions had addressed the question directly. The approach designed by the 
Court as a 'minority' had, in fact, been adopted by a majority of the courts of 
appeals at that time."). 
280. 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (NJ. 1965). The continuing validity of Santor, even under 
New Jersey state law, is questionable at best. See Boyes v. Greenwich Boat 
Works, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.NJ. 1998) (discussing Alloway v. General 
Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264 (NJ. 1997). More recently, Alloway extended the 
economic loss rule doctrine to transactions which could be characterized as 
consumer sales, overruling an arguably conflicting decision in Santor. The 
Santor approach permits a consumer to maintain an action in strict liability 
for loss of value, whether or not the defect causes a risk of unreasonable 
harm. See East River S.S. Crnp., 476 U.S. at 868-69 & n.4. 
281. See Santor, 207 A.2d at 312-13. 
282. See Emerson C.M. Diesel, Inc., 732 F.2d at 1472 (allowing recovery for economic 
losses accrued when a fishing vessel's port reduction gear failed while under-
way in the Bering Sea), overruled on different grounds by East River S.S. Crnp., 476 
U.S. 858. The Emerson court observed that "[t]he rationale for the rule al-
lowing recovery of lost profits in an admiralty negligence action is 'the famil-
iar principle that seamen are favorites of admiralty and their economic inter-
ests entitled to the fullest possible legal protection.' " Id. (quoting Carbone v. 
Ursich, 209 F.2d 178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953) (allowing the crew members of a 
fishing vessel to recover lost profits from owners of another vessel that negli-
gently fouled their nets». Other courts have similarly allowed fishermen to 
recover for economic losses due to the special solicitude given to them. See 
Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398-99 (4th Cir. 1997). In 
Yannouth Sea Products Ltd., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that "the special rule applicable to [commercial] fishermen" per-
mitted the recovery for proven lost profits from the catch ordinarily earned, 
but lost, because of a collision caused by the inattentive lookout. See id. The 
court exhibited this special solicitude despite an explicit notation that "the 
Robins Dry Dock principle [of no recovery for economic losses in tort] is alive 
and well in the Fourth Circuit." Id. But see McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor 
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courts adopting the Santor approach allowed the recovery of eco-
nomic losses in tort by rationalizing that there was no reason to ar-
bitrarily preclude tort recovery where the product fortuitously in-
jured itself without personal injury or damage to other property.283 
Because of the contradictory philosophical approaches utilized by 
the other federal circuits sitting in admiralty, the United States Su-
preme Court clearly needed to harmonize these differences. How-
ever, not until 1986 did the Court formally acknowledge products li-
ability as an admiralty cause of action,284 after granting certiorari in 
a case from the Third Circuit that had taken a unique approach by 
disallowing recovery for economic losses utilizing a risk-of-harm bal-
ancing test.285 
VI. THE EAST RIVER DOCTRINE 
A. Factual Background 
In East River Steamship Carp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,286 the 
bareboat charterers287 of four American built288 and flagged super-
tankers289 sought to recoup more than $8 million in costs for repair-
Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D. NJ. 1986) (refusing to award lost profits to com-
mercial fisherman for products liability claim stemming from engine failure 
caused by defective crankshaft), rejected by Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. General Elec. 
Co., 134 F.3d 149, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1998). 
283. See Emerson C.M. Diesel, Inc., 732 F.2d at 1474. 
284. See East River S.S. Cary., 476 U.S. at 865. When the Supreme Court finally ad-
dressed the issue of whether to adopt products liability tenets into the sub-
stantive maritime law, there was nearly universal acceptance of this doctrine 
by the federal courts sitting in admiralty. See Ocean Barge Transp. Co. v. Hess 
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1984). 
285. See East River S.S. Cary., 752 F.2d 903, aff'd sub nom., East River S.S. Cary., 476 
U.S. 858 (1986). . 
286. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
287. A bareboat charter is, in essence, a maritime long-term rental contract. See 
GILMORE & BlAcK, supra note 24, § 4-1, at 134 ("[T]he charterer takes over 
the ship, lock, stock and barrel, and mans her with his own people. He be-
comes, in effect, the owner pro hac vice . ... "); see also East River S.S. Cary., 476 
U.S. at 860 ("Each petitioner operated under a bareboat charter, by which it 
took full control of the ship for 20 or 22 years as though it owned it, with the 
obligation afterwards to return the ship[s] to the real owner." (citing GILMORE 
AND BlACK, supra note 24, §§ 4-1, 4-22». 
288. See East River S.S. Cary., 752 F.2d at 903.Q4. 
289. See GREG S. MARsrON, TANKER OPERATIONS: A HANDBOOK FOR THE SHIP'S OFFICER 
6-11 (1981). Supertankers are very-large crude carriers (VLCCs), "roughly [de-
fined] as tankers of 160,000 [deadweight tonnage] and over" which usually 
carry crude oil, but also can carry bulk refined petrochemical products as 
cargo. Id. at 7. They are usually equipped with a "single steam turbine con-
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ing their steam-turbine propulsion units and for lost revenue in-
curred during voyage deviations and unscheduled shipyard 
periods.2OO The claims arose from the purportedly negligent design 
and manufacture of the units as well as the negligent supervision of 
the installation of the steam-turbines that powered the vessels.291 
Three of the four vessels suffered major engineering plant failures 
while at sea.292 The fourth ship's engineering plant experienced 
problems during its maiden voyage;293 its astern guardian valve had 
been installed backwards and damaged the ship's main engine 
when high-pressure steam entered the low-pressure turbine stage.294 
B. The Holding and Rationale of the East River Court 
As a threshold matter, Justice Blackmun, writing for a unani-
mous Court, recognized that the federal circuits sitting in admiralty 
had overwhelmingly adopted products liability concepts.295 Without 
much discussion,296 the East River Court felt compelled to "join the 
Courts of Appeal in recognizing products liability in negligence, in-
cluding strict liability, as part of the general maritime law"297 espe-
nected to the propeller shaft" for propulsion as was the case with these four 
vessels. [d. VLCCs are the largest moving objects ever built. See id. at 10. 
These supertankers were built by Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation in Brook-
lyn, New York, and were christened as the Stuyvesant, the Williamsburg, the 
Brooklyn, and the Bay Ridge. See East River S.S. Corp., 752 F.2d at 905. They were 
an exception to the rule that "VLCCs are built in foreign yards and rarely fly 
the American flag." Marston, supra, at 11 (citing Fig. 10, at page 14, a photo-
graph of the Brooklyn, at 225,000 tons deadweight). 
290. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 861. 
291. See id. 
292. See id. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. at 865 (citing Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 99-100 (3d Cir. 
1945) (adopting liability without fault for unseaworthiness), rev'd in part and 
affd in part on·other grounds, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), overruled by statute as noted by 
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatiantique, 443 U.S. 256, 262 & n.ll 
(1979); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 
1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1977». 
296. See Davis, supra note 279 at 1082 (chronicling the "culture of irresponsibility" 
whereby institutional defendants are freed from tort liability and discussing 
the Court's trend toward immunity from products liability). The author 
opines that: "One would have thought that the [East River] Court would take 
more time to explore fully the policies behind an area of law that had caused 
turmoil in state courts for the previous twenty years." Id. 
297. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865-66 
(1986). 
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cially in view of the Court's own precedents.298 The Court also 
found it desirable to harmonize the differing approaches taken by 
the federal appellate courts to answer the question of whether a 
marine products liability claim existed for injury to a product itself. 
The East River Court examined the spectrum of answers 
spawned by courts, Congress, and commentators.299 Looking specifi-
cally at the approaches adopted by the land-based courts and fed-
eral courts sitting in admiralty, the Court observed that several dis-
tinct judicial philosophies had evolved to address the special 
concerns created in the area of products liability3°O to resolve dis-
putes, the resolution of which lie at the concursus301 of tort and 
contract.302 As they had manifested themselves in the federal cir-
cuits, these differences precluded uniformity and decisional predict-
ability-the touchstones of admiralty law.303 
Wanting to "keep products liability and contract law in separate 
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages,"304 the 
East River Court rejected the balancing-of-harm305 and minority loss 
298. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 
U.S. 315, 318 & n.3 (1964) (addressing a stevedore's claim for a breach of im-
plied warranty of workmanlike service even though the company acted with-
out negligence in furnishing the allegedly defective equipment that injured 
the employee); Sieracki., 328 U.S. at 97 (extending strict liability for the unsea-
worthiness of a vessel's cargo gear to stevedores). 
299. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 868 & n.3. 
300. See id. at 868-70 & nn.4-5. 
301. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 292 (6th ed. 1990). Concursus is where "[i]n the 
civil law, a running together ... or meeting ... of actions" occurs. !d. Con-
cursus is also a legal term of art for an admiralty proceeding. See Complaint 
of Dredging Equip., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining 
that a concursus is a limitation of liability proceeding). A shipowner can limit 
liability arising from a maritime tort without privity or knowledge of the oc-
currence to the value of the vessel and its pending earnings under 46 U.S.C. 
App. § 183(a). See id. However, when the claimed amount is greater than the 
value of the vessel and its pending freights its accounts receivables "the court 
engages in a concursus, a proceeding where it determines 'whether there was 
negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the owner; 
and if limitation is granted, how the [limitation] fund should be distributed'" 
!d. (quoting Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale, 595 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 
1979) ). 
302. SeeJay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 667 
(1989) ("The problem of product-related economic loss ... could be treated 
under either a tort or a contract rubric."). 
303. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 863 & n.l. 
304. Id. at 871. 
305. See id. at 870. The East River Court characterized this approach as "attempting 
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of value306 positions, reasoning that warranty was the proper remedy 
for a defective product causing only economic losses.307 The Court 
held that "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty 
under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to pre-
vent a product from injuring itself. "308 In denying the tort claims, 
the Court explained that "[ w] hen a product injures only itself the 
reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the 
parties to its contractual remedies are strong. "309 
The Supreme Court relied heavily on the inconsistency be-
tween the underlying purpose of products liability and the recovery 
of purely economic losses. It indicated that the underlying policy 
reasons for a tort cause of action sounding in products liability al-
lows "more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by 
the law of warranty. "310 Specifically with regard to the safety con-
cerns underlying tort law, the Court observed: "[T] he tort concern 
with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product it-
self. "311 In contrast with personal injuries, which could create over-
whelming misfortunes, the Court characterized the recovery of 
to differentiate between 'the disappointed users . . . and the endangered 
ones.'" [d. at 869-70 (quoting Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 
(1978». The Court rejected the balancing-of-harm approach because it "es-
sentially turn[ed] on the degree of risk, [which is] too indeterminate to en-
able manufacturers [to] easily ... structure their business behavior." [d. The 
Court further reasoned that even if the irtiury to a product occurred in an 
"abrupt, accident-like event," any recovery is geared to correcting "the failure 
of the purchaser to receive the benefit of the bargain-traditionally the core 
concern of contract law." [d. (citing E. AllAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs § 12.8, 
at 839-40 (1982». Maryland applies this type of balancing to determine 
whether a tort plaintiff may receive recovery for purely economic losses. See 
infra notes 373, 439. 
306. See East River S.S. Carp., 476 U.S. at 870-71. The Court recognized the many ar-
guments for not differentiating between economic losses and those that result 
in personal injury or property damage to other property. See id. at 868-69 
(noting that multiple courts have concluded that treating purely economic 
losses differently would generate arbitrary results that are not necessarily con-
sistent with the principles underlying products liability law). Nonetheless, the 
Court found the arguments in favor of a distinction to be "more powerful." 
[d. at 870. 
307. See id. at 872. 
308. [d. at 871 & n.6. The East River Court noted that it did not reach the issue of 
whether an action in tort could ever be asserted in admiralty if the damages 
are purely economic. See id. 
309. [d. at 871. 
310. [d. at 866 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965». 
311. [d. 
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purely economic losses in tort as insurable events for which no spe-
cial protection was required. 312 
The Court likewise noted the economic impact of permitting 
parties to recover for damages solely to the product itself,3J3 observ-
ing: "The increased cost to the public that would result from hold-
ing a manufacturer liable in tort for i~ury to a product itself -is not 
justified. "314 The East River Court averted any recovery in the ship 
charterer's tort action and concluded that the cause of action more 
properly belonged under a warranty daim,315 absent any personal 
injury or damage to "other property. "316 Observing that "the con-
tractual responsibilities were thus clearly laid out," the East River 
Court refused to "extricate the parties from their bargain"317 as the 
'~maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose 
of express and implied warranties."318 
Even though the petitioners attempted to recover for damages 
to other parts of the supertankers caused by the defective steam 
plants, the Court precluded recovery.319 The Supreme Court ex-
plained that the component failures of the supertankers' steam 
plants, which damaged only the engines themselves and only caused 
economic losses, did not rise to the level or type of danger for 
which products liability was meant to compensate.320 The Court rea-
soned that as " 'all but the very simplest of machines have compo-
312. See id. at 871-72. 
313. See id. at 874. "In products-liability law, where there is a duty to the public 
generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake. Permitting recovery for all 
. foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a manufacturer liable 
for vast sums." [d. (citations omitted). 
314. [d. at 872 (citation omitted). 
315. If the claims had been contractually based upon warranty, the East River Court 
noted that admiralty jurisdiction would not be applicable and state law would 
supply the rule of decision. See id. at 872 & n.7. See also supra notes 252-59 and 
accompanying text. 
316. The East River Court considered "other property" to mean property damaged 
by the product other than damage to the product itself. See East River S.S. 
Carp., 476 U.S. at 867. In East River, the turbines only damaged themselves. See 
id. at 875. On the count alleging the "reverse installation of the astern guard-
ian valve," the Supreme Court observed similarly that "the only harm was to 
the propulsion system itself rather than to persons or other property." [d. at 
875-76. Thus, these economic losses fell outside the zone of recovery under 
the economic loss rule. See id. at 876. 
317. [d. at 875. 
318. /d. at 872. 
319. See id. at 867-68. 
320. See id. at 867. 
1999] East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delaval 473 
nent parts, [a contrary] holding would require a finding of "prop-
erty damage" in virtually every case where a product damages 
itself.' "321 
C. East River Doctrine Modified by the Supreme Court in Saratoga Fish-
ing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co. 
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Martinac & CO.,322 the Supreme 
Court modified East River's preclusion of recovery for economic 
losses by holding that the doctrine does not extend to physical dam-
age to other property on a vessel added after its initial sale.323 Here, 
the M/V Saratoga sank as a result of an engine room fire and subse-
quent flooding. 324 This fishing vessel was built by J.M. Martinac and 
Company fifteen years earlier and was originally equipped with a hy-
draulic system placed in the engine room that was designed by 
Marco Seattle but installed by the shipbuilder.325 Mter the launching 
and sale to Joseph Madruga, the M/V Saratoga was outfitted with ad-
ditional equipment used for the tuna fishing industry.326 Three years 
later, the vessel was sold to the Saratoga Fishing Company, which 
continued to use it in the tuna industry until it sank in 1987.327 At 
trial, the Saratoga Fishing Company received damages for the addi-
tional equipment added by the original purchaser.328 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the trial court, refusing to uphold the award of 
purely economic damages.329 According to the intermediate court, 
321. Id. (quoting Northern Power & Eng. Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 
324, 330 (Alaska 1981». Whether other property was meant to apply to the 
whole vessel or a component not manufactured by the defendant was not 
clearly delineated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
faced this issue in Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925 
(5th Cir. 1987). Here, buyers of defective vessels sought to recover economic 
damages from the designer of the steering mechanism for damages to compo-
nents parts unrelated to the steering mechanism. See id. at 929. The court 
concluded that allowing buyers to recover under the "other property" excep-
tion under these circumstances would undermine East River and specifically 
defined "product" as the entire vessel. See id. at 929-30. 
322. 520 U.S. 875 (1997). 
323. See id. at 884. 
324. Id. at 877. 
325. See id. 
326. See id. 
327. See id. 
328. See id. at 877-78. 
329. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1145 (9th Cir. 1995), 
rev'd, 520 U.S. 875. 
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added equipment "was part of the ship when [the original pur-
chaser] sold the ship to Saratoga Fishing, and, for that reason, . . . 
the added equipment was part of the defective product that itself 
caused the harm."33o The court's holding was over the objections of 
a lone dissenter who argued that the additional equipment consti-
tuted "other property" under East Riv(ff.331 
Subsequently agreeing with the dissenting judge, the Supreme 
Court explained that East Riv(ff doctrine was inapplicable in cases 
where damage was to the property added after a subsequent sale 
that was not a causal factor in the injury.332 The Court was troubled 
by the Ninth Circuit's holding333 that "create[d] a tort damage im-
munity beyond that set by any relevant tort precedent ... found."334 
The Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting judge of the Ninth 
Circuit that this was an unwarranted extension of East Riv(ff that cre-
ated more confusion regarding the economic loss doctrine's limits, 
particularly where the equipment added to the ship was not part of 
the benefit of the bargain in the original sale.335 
The underlying facts of Saratoga may have suggested to the Su-
preme Court that a more liberal and equitable view of the East RiV(ff 
doctrine was required.336 The Saratoga Court recognized that new 
owners of a vessel would in all probability alter it with new property, 
which should not be construed as the product itself if it were not 
part of the reason for the loss.337 
330. Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 878. 
331. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1447 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
332. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 884-85. According to the Saratoga Court: 
[d. 
We conclude that equipment added to a product after the Manufac-
turer (or distributor selling in the initial distribution chain) has sold 
the product to an initial User is not part of the product that itself 
caused physical harm. Rather, in East River's language, it is "other 
property." (We are speaking, of course, of added equipment that it-
self played no causal role in the accident that caused the physical 
harm.). 
333. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1445 (holding that "the skiff, net, fuel, spare 
parts, and miscellaneous equipment, those items are part of the product and 
are not recoverable in a tort action as 'other property' H), rev'd, 520 U.S. 875 
(1997). 
334. Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 880. 
335. See id. at 879; Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1447 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
336. See Saratoga Fishing Co., 520 U.S. at 884-85. 
337. See id. 
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VII. EAST RIVER DOCTRINE APPLIED WITH CONTRARY RE-
SULTS IN MARYLAND'S FEDERAL COURT 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
has experienced some difficulty applying the harsh mandate of East 
River.338 The following two cases, decided in Maryland's federal 
court, exemplify the confusion over the East River economic loss 
rule as their legal conclusions directly controvert each other.339 
A. Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc. 
In Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc.,340 David and The-
resa Sherman sought recovery under various tort and contract 
causes of action against a yacht seller, Ocean Yachts, and other de-
fendants. 341 One of the boat's main engines caught fire while off-
shore of Ocean City, Maryland.342 Unable to extinguish the fire, Mr. 
Sherman abandoned the burning vessel, which ultimately sank, and 
was rescued.343 Fortunately, he was uninjured.344 In response to the 
plaintiffs' tort-based claims, the seller of the yacht raised the East 
River doctrine.345 
The plaintiffs attempted to avoid the preclusive economic loss 
rule with two arguments, both of which the court accepted. The 
Shermans distinguished their relationship with the yacht seller from 
the commercial relationship in East River.346 Unlike the parties in 
East River, who had a ship-builder / ship-owner relationship, the 
plaintiffs argued that they had a consumer-producer connection 
with Ocean Yachts and therefore, were not precluded from recovery 
338. See Shennan v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501'{)2 (D. 
Md. 1990) (awarding economic loss damages for a recreational vessel lost as a 
result of fire in a products liability action). But see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver 
Boat Corp., No. 96-194, 1997 WL 714900, *24 (D. Md. May 29, 1997) (denying 
a marine products liability claim for economic losses occasioned by fire to a 
recreational vessel). 
339. See infra Part VI. 
340. 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1990). 
341. See id. at 501'{)2. The count for breach of warranty claims survived motion to 
dismiss. See id. at 501. 
342. See id. at 500. 
343. See id. 
344. See id. Had Mr. Shennan been injured, he may have recovered his purely eco-
nomic losses sustained from the sinking of the yacht. See 1 DUNN, supra note 
265, § 3.7, at 204 (observing that the existence of even slight physical injury 
may pennit recovery and discussing several cases with "extreme" results). 
345. See id. at 501. 
346. See id. at 501'{)2. 
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of economic losses by the East River doctrine.347 The federal district 
court found East River inapplicable to the facts in Sherman on this 
basis.348 
The Sherman court noted that because the East River Court 
found no need to intrude into the commercial parties' choice to 
risk shift, it drew a distinction between the consumer (non-commer-
cial) purchasers and a commercial seller.349 The Sherman court re-
lied on the repeated references by the East River Court to the com-
mercial context to conclude that its rule of preclusion applied solely 
to commercial transactions.35o Although noting that the Supreme 
Court "did not define 'commercial relationship' ", the Sherman 
court nonetheless concluded that the East River Court had "set out 
some characteristics of such a relationship. "351 Considering the na-
ture of the transaction, the court refused to define the Shermans' 
transaction with Ocean Yachts as commercial.352 
347. See id. at 502. 
348. See id. 
349. See id. at 502. 
350. See id. at 501. As noted by the Sherman court, the East River Court addressed 
the issue of " 'whether a commercial product injuring itself is the kind of hann 
against which public policy requires manufacturers to protect, independent of 
any contractual obligation.' " !d. at sal (quoting East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 
at 866) (emphasis added). Also noted by the Sherman court was the East River 
Court's holding that, "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no 
duty" under negligence or strict liability to "prevent a product from injuring 
itself." fd. (quoting East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 871) (emphasis added). In 
support of its holding, the Sherman court also referenced a footnote in which 
the East River Court refused to "eliminate all tort causes of action when the 
only damages sought are economic." fd. (citing East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 
at 871 n.6). This was certainly a reasonable interpretation of East River given 
the Court's clear analysis of a problematic commercial transaction and the 
Court's express language in its holding. See also East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 
at 871-76. 
351. Sherman, 760 F. Supp. at 501. For example, while discussing tort safety con-
cerns and product injury, the East River Court stated: 
[When] a product injuries itself, the commercial user stands to lose the 
value of the product, risks the displeasure of its customers who find 
that the product does not meet their needs, or as in [East River 
Steamship's case, experiences increased costs in performing a service . .. 
[l] osses like these can be insured. 
fd. at 501'{)2 (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 
U.S. 858, 871-72 (1986». 
352. See id. at 502. The Sherman court also relied on the conclusion of some courts 
and commentators that the East River doctrine does not apply in the non-
commercial context and the failure of the defendant to produce a case in 
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The second argument turned on the definition of other prop-
erty loss-the East River doctrine only precludes recovery for eco-
nomic losses to the product itself, that is the vessel, in tort.353 The 
Shermans argued that the "other property" that they had added to 
their vessel and lost as a result of the fire and sinking should be re-
coverable in tort.354 The court agreed with the Shermans' view, con-
cluding "that the economic damage went beyond the product itself 
and included 'other property,' specifically, various items of personal 
property ... [that were] not components of the yacht" and denied 
the defendant's motion to dismiss.355 Thus, the Shermans were able 
to avoid the East River economic loss rule on that ground as well.356 
B. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Carver Boat Corp. 
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Carver Boat Corp.,357 an unreported 
opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land sitting in admiralty came to a very different conclusion in its 
second opportunity to apply the East River economic loss rule.358 
The plaintiff insurance company sought subrogation after paying an 
insurance claim stemming from the loss of a recreational vesseP59 
The yacht burned because of an electrical failure while the vessel 
was berthed at a marina.360 In the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, the issue was again whether the East River doctrine ap-
plied in a non-commercial context. 361 Relying on Sherman, the plain-
which the doctrine was applied to a claim for economic damages arising from 
a non-commercial relationship. See id. (citations omitted). 
353. See id. at 501-02. If Saratoga Fishing Co. v. JM. Martinac & Co. had been de-
cided before the Shermans sued, it would have not compelled a different re-
sult; the Sherman court's decision presaged Saratoga's subsequent holding that 
allowed recovery of other property losses. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Mar-
tinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997). For a discussion of Saratoga Fishing Co., see 
supra Part VI.C. 
354. See Shennan, 760 F. Supp. at 501. 
355. See id. 
356. Id. at 502. 
357. No. 96-194, 1997 WL 714900 (D. Md. May 29, 1997). 
358. See id. at *1. 
359. See id. 
360. See id. at *1, *3. 
361. See id. at *1 & n.l. The Reliance Insurance Co. court noted that the Sherman 
commercial/noncommercial vessel distinction was predicated on cases that 
"were all decided in the context of commercial transactions." Id. (citing Em-
ployers Ins. of Wausau v. Suwanee River Spa Lines, 866 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 
1989) (barring recovery under the economic loss rule for a suit by the owner 
of a sunken tugboat against the vessel's builder and supervisor of construction 
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tiffs argued that the court should again limit the East River doctrine 
to commercial users.362 Writing for the federal district court in Reli-
ance Insurance Co., Judge Nickerson candidly observed that since his 
decision in Sherman, "the law has obviously evolved in a manner not 
anticipated by this [Court] at the time it rendered its decision."363 
Therefore, the Reliance Insurance Co. court refused to regenerate the 
Sherman holding to distinguish between non-commercial and com-
mercial buyers of marine products.364 Nevertheless, as Reliance Insur-
ance Co. is an unreported decision, it binds only the parties to the 
action, and has no precedential value for other cases.365 
The court's decision to forgo the distinction between commer-
cial and non-commercial users of a maritime product was founded 
upon two disarmingly simple precepts. First, according to the court, 
the ability of consumers to purchase insurance to protect against 
the risk of vessel loss mitigates the need for a distinction.366 Second, 
the court saw little difference between commercial users of a 
marine product and sophisticated recreational vessel owners.367 Al-
though sellers and consumers are not ordinarily considered to be 
bargaining equals, unlike the parties in a commercial transaction, 
of the integrated tug and barge unit); Richard O'Brien Cos. v. Challenge 
Cook Bros., 672 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1987) (addressing a non-maritime case 
in which the owner of cement pumps sought recovery for economic loss); 
Consumers Power Co. v. Mississippi Valley Structural Steel Co., 636 F. Supp. 
1100 (E. Mich. 1986) (considering the claims of an owner and builder of nu-
clear power plant for economic losses incurred because of a reactor's defec-
tive anchor bolts». 
362. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900 at *1. 
363. !d. at *2; see also Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, Inc., 785 F. 
Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. N.Y 1992). 
364. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *1, *3. 
365. See FED. R i\pP. P. 36(c) ("Citation of this Court's unpublished dispositions in 
briefs and oral arguments in this Court and in the district courts within this 
Circuit is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estop-
pel, or the law of. the case."). In Maryland state courts, an unreported opin-
ion is neither binding precedent nor persuasive authority. See MD. RULE 8-
114(a). 
366. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *2 (noting that the East River Court 
"focused on the availability of insurance-and non-commercial vessels are also 
usually insured") (citing Karshan, 785 F. Supp. at 366; Sisson v. Hatteras 
Yachts, Inc., No. 87-C0652, 1991 WL 47543, *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1991»; see also 
1 PARKS, supra note 7, at 3 ("[The] importance [of] insurance in maritime af-
fairs cannot be overemphasized. Without exception, it pervades every single 
sphere of maritime activities and, absent marine insurance protection, mari-
time commerce could come to a standstill."). 
367. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *2. 
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the Reliance Insurance Co. court concluded that most federal courts 
that had considered the issue "discard[ed] the commercial/non-
commercial distinction as useless and likely to lead to confusion. "368 
The Reliance Insurance Co. court also considered and explicitly 
rejected the plaintiff's argument that even if the East River rule ap-
plied, the exception to the economic loss rule fashioned by the Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals should be applied.369 Maryland's economic 
loss rule exception370 distinctly differs from the East River doctrine.371 
368. Id. (quoting Somerset Marine Inc. v. Forespar Prods. Corp., 876 F. Supp. 1114, 
1115 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Sisson, 1991 WL 47543, at *2 (addressing an ad-
miralty claim for a vessel that sank in Indiana waters due to a defective 
onboard washer/dryer unit»); Karshan, 785 F. Supp. at 365-66; Lewinter v. 
Genmar Indus., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 308-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (considering 
a catastrophic hull failure from defective fiberglass hull delamination». The 
court also relied on the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Stanton 
v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15 (Wash. 1993). Judge Nickerson observed 
that the Stanton court echoed the admiralty principle of uniformity-tradi-
tional maritime law does not differentiate based on the commercial or non-
commercial nature of an activity. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *2 
(citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1982». 
369. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, *3. 
370. See Milton Co. v. Council of Unit Owners of Bentley Place Condominium, 121 
Md. App. 100, 708 A.2d 1047 (1998), aff'd, 354 Md. 264, 729 A.2d 981 (1999). 
Although recognizing that plaintiffs ordinarily do not recover for purely eco-
nomic losses in tort, the court of special appeals recently recounted: 
The Court of Appeals has held, however, that a plaintiff may recover 
in tort for purely economic loss where the defect creates a substantial 
and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury .... Moreover, 
when parties to a negligence action share an "intimate nexus," satis-
fied by "privity of contract or its equivalent," recovery in negligence 
may be had for "economic loss," despite the absence of any risk that 
personal injury will result: "Where the failure to exercise due care 
creates a risk of economic loss only, courts have generally required 
an intimate nexus between the parties as a condition to the imposi-
tion of tort liability. This intimate nexus satisfied by contractual priv-
ity or its equivalent. By contrast, where the risk created is one of per-
sonal injury, no such direct relationship need be shown, and the 
principal determinate of duty becomes foreseeability." 
Id. at 115-16, 708 A.2d at 1054 (quoting Jacques v. First National Bank, 307 
Md. 527, 534-35, 515 A.2d 756 (1986». For a thorough treatment of Mary-
land's stance on tort recovery of economic loss, see generally Michael R. Mc-
Cann, Comment, Atlantis Revisited: Recovery Under Maryland Law for Purely Ear-
nomic Loss Against Negligent Builders and Manufacturers, 23 U. BALT. L. REv. 521 
(1994). Obviously, this approach is in sharp contrast to that of the East River 
Court. See supra notes 285-320 and accompanying text. . 
371. Under the East River doctrine, the federal courts may not award recovery for 
purely economic losses absent personal injury or damage to other property 
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However, the court, in deference to the East River rule and the re-
quirement for consistency observed372 that "the need for uniformity 
in maritime products liability law prohibits this Court from applying 
Maryland's 'risk of harm' rule in this admiralty action."373 
The Reliance Insurance Co. court's treatment of the East River 
doctrine is arguably an ambivalent result. The court correctly de-
clined to apply Maryland law to fashion a remedy; such a displace-
ment would have been an affront to federal interests by violating 
admiralty law's guiding principles of decisional uniformity and con-
sistency.374 Nevertheless, this unpublished decision did not expressly 
overrule the result in Sherman, although it certainly cast considera-
ble doubt as to its continued vitality.375 
VIII. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. Recovery in Other Jurisdictions 
Two jurisdictions other than Maryland have also considered the 
issue of whether to provide remedies under state law or under the 
other than the product itself, whereas in Maryland, a potentiality of an unrea-
sonable risk of hann is sufficient to allow recovery. Compare East River S.S. 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986), with AJ. 
DeCoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 33 Md. 245, 251, 634 A.2d 1330 
1333 (1994). 
372. See East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 870. 
373. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *3. 
374. Unfortunately, the Yamaha Court has apparently signaled a departure from 
the once fairly stringent uniformity and consistency principles of admiralty 
law that ordinarily preclude recovery under state law. See Burrell, supra note 
131, at 74. Yamaha "provides an excellent example of the characterization 
problems that arise in recreational boating cases and of the temptation to 
bend the law to the circumstances of the case." Id. at 75. Whether the Su-
preme Court's decision will affect other substantive areas of admiralty law is 
an open question; the Yamaha Court did not address "whether federal mari-
o time or state law should fonn the substantive law ... providing the rule of 
law for remedies [for wrongful death claims and] ... and those remedies may 
change when the vessel crosses the mystical three mile limit and unseen state 
boundaries." Russell & Nikas; supra note 104, at 387. 
375. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, 785 F. Supp. 363, 365 & n.2 
(E.D.N.Y 1992) (disagreeing with Shennan v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, 
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1990»; v. Lewinter v. Genmar Indus., 32 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 305, 309 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that Sherman was the only 
published case that drew a distinction between commercial and consumer ves-
sel transactions); Alloway v. General Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 270 (NJ. 
1997) (characterizing Sherman as against the weight of authority); Stanton v. 
Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 21-23 (Wash. 1993) (suggesting that the 
continued vitality of Sherman was doubtful and observing that the Sherman de-
cision stood alone against the weight of authority). 
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general maritime law.376 Likewise, these cases also reveal the diffi-
culty that a court encounters in harmonizing the harsh federal rule 
with a consumer-boater's need for protection from defective marine 
products.377 In Stanton v. Bayliner Manne Corp.,378 a consolidated ac-
tion brought in Washington state court, the plaintiffs claimed that 
their forty-five foot boats were lost because the design of the recrea-
tional vessels' keels created an unreasonable risk of mass flooding 
should an accidental grounding, stranding, or a submerged object 
puncture the hull.379 
The parties in Stanton vigorously disputed whether East Rivers 
doctrinal mandate extended to consumers or whether it was factu-
ally limited to commercial transactions.380 Relying on Sherman,381 the 
plaintiffs contended that the economic loss rule barring recovery in 
tort as applied to consumers was still undeveloped and thus, state 
law could provide the appropriate remedy.382 However, after looking 
to other jurisdictions' treatment of cases where yacht-owners suf-
fered only economic losses, the court concluded that the mandate 
of East River was equally suitable to both commercial and consumer 
vessel transactions.383 The Stanton court decided that the lower court 
erred by displacing the East River doctrine with a remedy under 
Washington state law.384 Premised on the erroneous notion that the 
376. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 22 (declining to depart from admiralty's uniformity 
principle and barring recovery for the losses of two yachts); Goldson v. Carver 
Boat Corp., 707 A.2d 193, 198 (NJ. App. Ct. 1998) (barring a claim for recov-
ery of a destroyed yacht and noting that the "substantive maritime law relat-
ing to tort recovery is abundantly clear"). 
377. See, e.g., Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 844 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Wash. App. Ct. 
1992) (observing that the East River Court "unjustifiably dismisses the safety 
concerns attendant to product injuries caused by hazardous defects."), rro'd, 
866 P.2d 15 (Wash. 1993). But see Burrell, supra note 131, at 79 ("[C]are must 
be taken that the balancing of national and state interests is not result-ori-
ented ... "). 
378. 866 P.2d 15 (Wash. 1993). 
379. See id. at 17. The plaintiffs asserted that their boat sank in 12 minutes after 
striking a submerged rock in Puget Sound. See id. Bayliner maintained that 
the sinking actually took 27 minutes. See id. 
380. See id. at 21. 
381. Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 
1990). 
382. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 17. 
383. See id. at 23. In addition, the Stanton court relied on Foremost Ins. Co. v. Rich-
ardson, 457 U.S. 668,674-75 (1982). 
384. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 20. 
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consumer concerns were local, not maritime,385 the lower court su-
perseded the federal interest in admiralty uniformity.386 Recognizing 
that there is no distinction between pleasure boats and commercial 
vessels in marine products liability cases,387 the Supreme Court of 
Washington reasoned that "Washington's interest in providing a 
remedy . . . does not outweigh federal interests in uniformity"388 
and reversed the lower court.389 
Having decided that the East River economic loss rule would be 
applicable to the plaintiffs' yacht losses, the court next examined 
the issue of whether the substantive maritime law preempted Wash-
ington's risk-of-harm balancing test. 390 Reviewing the Washington 
Products Liability Act391 and the legislative intent underlying its pro-
mulgation,392 the Stanton court held that tort recovery for economic 
losses was specifically excluded under the Act because such claims 
were warranty actions under the Uniform Commercial Code.393 The 
court's characterization of this action did not conflict with the East 
River rule.394 However, there was an inherent conflict as to the man-
ner that economic loss was defined because Washington state law 
permitted recovery utilizing a risk-of-harm balancing test395 for pure 
economic losses, rather than the restrictive contract approach for-
mulated by the East River Court.396 The Stanton court held that there 
was no recovery in tort for the plaintiffs because "federal maritime 
law preempts application of a conflicting state law where there is a 
judicially fashioned admiralty rule on point [and] East River is the 
385. See id. (citing Stanton, 844 P.2d at 1019). Mter analyzing the harm suffered by 
the plaintiffs, the lower court explained: "Whatever federal interest in uni-
formity exists, it is outweighed by Washington's concern to ensure the per-
sonal safety of its citizens, to deter the manufacture and dissemination of dan-
gerous products, and to exercise its authority over tortfeasors acting within its 
jurisdiction." Stanton, 844 P.2d at 1023. 
386. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 20. 
387. See id. at 21-23. 
388. See id. at 26. 
389. Seeid. at 17. 
390. See id. at 24 (citing Stanton, 844 P.2d at 1019). 
39l. See id. at 18 n.2 (citing WASH. REv. CODE. §§ 7.72.010-060 (1992) (Washington's 
Products Liability Act». 
392. See id. at 26. 
393. See id. (citing WASH. REv. CODE. §§ 7.72.010(6), 7.72.020(2) (1992». 
394. See id. at 25. The Stanton court observed that "[t]he [Washington Products Li-
ability Act] does not conflict with the holding in East River." Id. 
395. See id. at 27 (citing Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 
1199, 1210 (Wash. 1989». 
396. See id. at 25. 
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maritime rule on economic loss. "397 
In a New Jersey case, the intermediate appellate court in Gold-
son v. Carver Boat Corp.398 also decided that the substantive remedies 
provided by state law must give way to the governing general mari-
time law.399 At a public sale, Goldson bought a powerboat valued at 
$175,000 for $125,000 in "as is" condition.400 Two months later, the 
boat caught fire while docked at a marina.401 After determining the 
cause of the fire,402 the plaintiff filed suit and advanced theories of 
negligence, strict liability, and warranty against the boat builder and 
engine installer.403 The court held that tort recovery was barred be-
cause the suit was for purely economic losses to the vessel itself,404 
observing that" [t]he substantive maritime law relating to tort recov-
ery of economic loss is abundantly clear"405 and affirming the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.406 
These decisions illustrate how a state court should apply the 
distinctive remedies afforded under the general maritime law as 
uniformity principles promote decisional consistency.407 There are 
only a few reasons why a state court should apply its own remedy 
rather than the governing substantive rule of admiralty:408 (1) the 
absence of any guiding admiralty principle,409 (2) the use of state 
law would merely impact a predominately local concern,410 or (3) 
the use of state law to supplement an inadequate rule provided by 
397. [d. at 28 . 
. 398. 707 A.2d 193 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
399. See id. at 198, 20l. 
400. See id. at 194. 
401. See id. at 194-95. Mter completing a "long hard run," the plaintiff docked the 
boat. [d. While the vessel had performed well during transit, the boat owner 
observed that a spark emanated from the engine compartment shortly after 
docking. See id. Mter opening the hatch, the boat caught on fire and was se-
verely damaged. See id. at 195. 
402. See id. at 195. The plaintiff's expert determined the cause of the fire and loss 
of the boat was "the improper installation of the [boat's] engine and its prox-
imity to the decking." [d. 
403. See id. 
404. See id. at 198. 
405. [d. 
406. See id. 
407. See Maryland Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 1226 (4th Cir. 
1995). 
408. See Burrell, supra note 131, at 65. 
409. See id. 
410. See id. 
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the substantive admiralty law.411 Although few state courts have faced 
this issue, they would likely follow the Stanton and Goldson decisions 
by adhering to federal admiralty precedents.412 However, one state 
supreme court has been "relatively bold in asserting the applicabil-
ity of state law in maritime cases. "413 
In Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.,414 the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana extended the "maritime but local concern" doctrine, 
which had been historically grounded in workers compensation 
cases,415 to strict liability.416 "As a matter of logic and legally permis-
sible principle [,]" the state's highest court asserted that it could "af-
ford a remedy not traditionally found in the maritime law, provided 
that the remedy neither conflicts with substantive maritime law nor 
impermissibly interferes with the requirement of uniformity."417 Be-
cause Green dealt with personal injuries sustained during the crash 
landing of a helicopter into the Gulf of Mexico approximately 150 
miles offshore of the Louisiana coast,418 the facts fell into an intersti-
tial space between substantive maritime law and applicable state 
law.419 Therefore, the supreme court permitted the plaintiff to re-
cover under the state strict liability statute420 as a supplement to the 
general maritime law, which provided no clear remedy.421 
Relying on Green, Louisiana's lower courts have extended Green 
411. See id. 
412. See Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 25 (Wash. 1993). But see 
Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 638-39 (La. 1992) (hold-
ing that predominately local interests mandated application of state law in-
stead of substantive maritime law). See also Burrell, supra note 131, at 69 (not-
ing that even where "local elements predominate," the use of this principle to 
apply a state law remedy "may be extremely disruptive to uniformity because 
they can be used as authority in subsequent cases to work harm to established 
maritime rules."). 
413. Robertson, supra note 82, at 703 (citing Green, 593 So. 2d at 638-39). 
414. 593 So. 2d 634, 636 (La. 1992), em. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992). 
415. See CALIFORNIA PLEASURE BOATING LAw, supra note 136, at 336 ("Most of the 
case law on the 'maritime but local' doctrine arose out of attempts to apply 
workmen's compensation statutes to maritime employment."). According to 
one writer, even though "[t]hese cases are instructive[,] they are of limited di-
rect application to pleasure boating enthusiasts." Id. 
416. See Green, 593 So. 2d at 643-44. 
417. Id. at 639. 
418. See id. at 635-36. 
419. See id. at 64142. 
420. See id. at 636 (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2317). 
421. See id. 
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to encompass marine products liability claims,422 although none 
have yet reached a case-with only economic losses. By permitting re-
covery under its state strict liability statute, Louisiana and its state 
courts are disregarding the East River mandate. While distinguisha-
ble on its facts from Sherman and Reliance Insurance Co., these Louisi-
ana cases could form the basis for an unwarranted and potentially 
harmful variance in admiralty law's uniformity principle.423 
B. Recovery in Marylt;md's Courts 
The contradictory signals sent by the. Maryland federal courts 
are not surprising. The Sherman court's result conforms with the 
plain language in East River, which clearly referred to the arms-
length transaction of sophisticated shipbuilders, shipowners, and 
charter parties.424 Whether the East River Court enVisioned that its 
mandate would preclude recreational vessel consumers from recov-
ering purely economic losses is debatable.425 This is particularly true 
in light of the Court's subsequent modification of East River in Sara-
toga-yet another case involving a sophisticated shipbuilder and ex-
perienced fishing vessel owners.426 Therefore, the Saratoga Court's 
reasoning arguably did not reach consumer recreational vessel 
transactions either.427 
On the other hand, there is ample authority to refrain from 
making a distinction between commercial and noncommercial ves-
422. See Brodtmann v. Duke, 708 So. 2d 447, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (considering 
the death of three passengers on a 37 foot cabin cruiser stemming from car-
bon monoxide emitted from a corroded marine generator exhaust); Zeller v. 
Olympic Marine Co., 692 So. 2d lIn, 1I75 (La. App. Ct. 1997) (addressing 
an injury caused by a defective barge loading system where wire line caught 
cleat on barge and snapped, but providing no recovery under either state or 
admiralty' law); Mayo v. Nissan Motor Corp., 639 So. 2d 773, 784-85 (La. App. 
Ct. 1994) (involving a failure to warn and holding that state law could supple-
ment East River). 
423. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
424. See supra notes 351-57 and accompanying text. Judge Nickerson's analysis was 
not followed by any other court, despite the readily distinguishable difference 
between the vessel's charterers in East River and the yacht owners in Sherman. 
See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, 785 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1992). 
425. The express language of the East River Court's holding referred to commercial 
users and did not mention recreational vessels at all. See supra text accompa-
nying note 307. 
426. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 877 (1997). 
427. See id. at 883. 
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selS.428 Even in the determination of subject matter jurisdiction, one 
of the most fundamental determinations in the evaluation of a mar-
itime claim, all courts in admiralty must disregard distinctions based 
on the vessel's use.429 Moreover, the East River Court's rationale that 
dissatisfaction with a commercial vessel and the corresponding re-
duction of any benefit of the bargain is best understood as a war-
ranty claim430 applies with equal force to consumers of recreational 
vessels.431 Therefore, the Reliance Insurance Co. court properly re-
fused to excuse the parties from their bargain because "litde distin-
guishes a commercial purchaser of a maritime vessel from a con-
sumer, [as] pleasure boat purchasers [generally] are sophisticated 
and perfectly capable of negotiating the terms of the [ir] vessel 
purchase. "432 
The consequences of applying the East River doctrine can be 
harsh, considering the protections afforded under state law. Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was adopted by the Maryland 
Court of Appeals to protect consumers from the unreasonable risk 
428. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1982) ("The federal 
interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if ad-
miralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged in commer-
cial maritime activity. "). 
429. See supra notes 14146 and accompanying text. 
430. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-74 
(1986) . 
431. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Shipyard, 785 F. Supp. 363, 365-66 
(E.D.N.Y 1992). The Karshan court reasoned that the East River Court did not 
limit its rationale to purely commercial transactions. See id. The court also 
quoted East River for the proposition that claims of this type should fall under 
warranty rather than tort. See id. at 366 (quoting East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 
at 866-68); see also Lewinter v. Genmar Indus., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 309 n.3 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (tracing the rationale of East River and observing with ap-
proval that a warranty remedy is appropriate). But see Alloway v. General 
Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 272-73 (NJ. 1997). The Alloway court put an in-
teresting limitation on its preclusion of economic recovery for tort and strict 
liability claims under state law: "[W]e do not reach the issue of the preclusion 
of a strict-liability claim when the parties are of unequal bargaining power, the 
product is a necessity, no alternative source for the product is readily available, 
and the purchaser cannot reasonably insure against consequential damages." 
Alloway, 695 A.2d at 273. (emphasis added). Although the Alloway court pre-
cluded recovery of purely economic losses on the specific facts in dispute, it 
did leave the door open to considering whether purely economic damages to 
other types of vessels, such as work boats or commercial fishing vessels, could 
be recovered. 
432. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Carver Boat Corp., No. 96-194, 1997 WL 714900, at *2 (D. 
Md. May 29, 1997). 
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of harm caused by defective products.433 Maryland courts also per-
mit plaintiffs to recover for economic losses where the mere poten-
tial of serious personal injury exists.434 However, if a purely eco-
nomic loss claim is heard in a Maryland court applying admiralty 
law, East Rivers economic loss rule and admiralty's principles may 
inflict severe penalties against a Maryland boater who purchases an 
expensive, but defective, yacht that causes no harm other than to 
the vessel itself.435 
Admittedly, the principles of uniformity and consistency in ad-
miralty adversely affect the rights of consumers who have far less ex-
perience in owning and operating their vessel than commercial ves-
sel owners. Laypersons may lack the ability to knowingly risk shift 
433. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 278 Md. 337, 352-53, 363 A.2d 955, 963 
(1976) (adopting section 402A); see also Awsumb, supra note 247, at 3. 
434. See Council of Co-Owners Atl. Condominium v. Whiting-Turner Contracting 
Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986). 
435. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900, at *3; see also Stanton v. Bayliner Marine 
Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 22 (Wash. 1993) (declining to depart from admiralty'S uni-
formity principle and disallowing any tort recovery for economic losses that 
might have been available under state law). But see Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hes-
ter, 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (1988). In Boate~ a non-admiralty action 
for breach of warranty and the tort of negligent misrepresentation was 
brought in Maryland state court to recover for a yacht'S hull failure during 
rough weather on the Chesapeake Bay. See id. at 289, 550 A.2d at 392. The 
Boatel court reversed the trial court's award of economic loss damages. See id. 
Deciding that the plaintiffs were not consumers, the court limited the remedy 
to repair costs. See id. at 296, 550 A.2d at 395. As reasoned by the Boatel court: 
"Because the Hesters suffered no physical injuries, their alleged damages be-
ing entirely economic losses, it would appear that they are likewise precluded 
from recovery for common law negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 307, 550 
A.2d at 401 (citing Flow Indus. v. Fields Const. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527,530 (D. 
Md. 1988); Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986); 
Copiers Typewriters Calculators v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 
1983». At least to the extent of the tort claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, it appears that "the determination of whether a duty will be imposed in 
this type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent con-. 
duct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resul-
tant damage." Id. at 308, 550 A.2d at 401 (citing Council of Co-Owners v. 
Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. 18,35,517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986». Once the duty of 
the defendant is established, "[ w] here the risk is of death or personal injury 
the action will lie for recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the dan-
gerous condition." Id. The Boatel court did not need to decide this case on 
the basis of the East River doctrine because recovery for economic losses was 
precluded by strict application of state limited warranty law. See id. Had this 
dispute been litigated under a maritime products liability theory, the East 
River doctrine should have also barred a tort recovery. 
488 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
liabilities436 or appreciate the complexity of the forces at work dur-
436. Of course, insurance is available to recreational vessel owners to protect them-
selves from potential liabilities. See Karshan v. Mattituck Inlet Marina & Ship-
yard, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. N.V. 1992) ("[V]essel owners can, and 
generally do, insure against losses to the value of the vessel. . . ." (citing East 
River S.S. Corp., v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986». The 
discrepancy lies where a knowledgeable vessel owner, such as a shipping com-
pany, has the power to negotiate equally with the vessel's builder and compo-
nent suppliers to favorably warranty their products, whereas a recreational ves-
sel owner may not have the bargaining power. See infra note 443. 
These differences also extend to the construction of the vessel and its subse-
quent use. Commercial vessels are usually built under the practiced eye of a 
classification society, such as the American Bureau of Shipping, and assem-
bled with component parts inspected and certified by the Bureau. See Matter 
of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 
954 F.2d 1279, 1286 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Machael A. Miller, Liability of Clas-
sification Societies from the Perspective of United States Law, 22 TUL. MAR. LJ. 75, 82-
88 (1997); ELIJAH BAKER. INTRODUCTION TO STEEL SHIPBUILDING 10-11 (2d ed. 
1953). 
Also, commercial vessels are generally operated by a licensed master who is 
assisted by a crew and officers that are explicitly required to obey the master's 
lawful commands. See 46 U.S.C. § 11,501(4) (1996) (enumerating penalties to 
be imposed on seamen for the willful disobedience of a lawful command at 
sea); Maes v. Los Angeles Tanker Operators, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 7, 8-10 (S.D. 
Tex. 1948) (rejecting a claim against a shipowner and vessel for false impris-
onment after the master confined the chief mate to his quarters and indicat-
ing that the chief mate's employment contract required him to obey all lawful 
commands of the officer in charge of the ship). In addition, the vessel opera-
tion, manning requirements, safety inspections, and repair schedules of com-
mercial vessels are heavily regulated. See also Western Pioneer, Inc. v. United 
States, 709 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Conversely, recreational craft are often built in mass production facilities 
and sold to dealers for resale to consumers, much like the automobile indus-
try. See Complaint of Dillahey, 733 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D.NJ. 1990); see also 
CHAPMfu'l, supra note 59, at 551. Frustrated at the ability of yacht owners to pe-
tition for exoneration from liability in what they plainly viewed as an action 
limited to commercial vessels, the Dillahey court observed: "Pleasure boating 
is . . . the product of a technology that can produce small boats at modest 
cost and of an economy that puts such craft within the means of almost every-
one." Dillahey, 733 F. Supp. at 879 (quoting Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and 
Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REv. 661, 661 (1963». Indeed, "[i]n 1995 
alone. recreational vessel sales reached more than 326,600 new units." Russell 
& Nikas. supra note 104, at 382 & n.1 (citing Marine Industry Recovery to 
Continue, CIT MARINE INDUSTRY OUTLOOK, June 25, 1996, at 1). Often times, 
the recreational vessel purchaser may be totally unfamiliar with maritime af-
fairs and rely on the dealer to provide information, warranty service, operat-
ing expertise, and perhaps even their first boat rides. See, e.g., Karshan, 785 F. 
Supp. at 365-{56. 
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ing a sojourn at sea, both natural437 and man-made.438 Furthermore, 
recreational vessel retailers and buyers may not have equal bargain-
ing power in their transactions.439 Nonetheless, even if pleaded, the 
Maryland courts should not distinguish between consumers who 
purchase recreational boats and owners of commercial vessels.440 
Any consumer/commercial or similar bargaining power-based dis-
tinction for maritime products liability claims entailing only eco-
nomic losses should come from Congress,441 either by explicit pre-
437. See DONALD A WHELPLEY, WEATHER, WATER AND BOATING at vii (1961). Accord-
ing to one commentator: 
Id. 
The sailor cannot escape from the elements, neither can he ignore 
weather, be it good, bad, or indifferent, because it surrounds him 
from the time he casts off until he bends on the last line at the dock 
and secures. Skippers of rowboats and . . . ships share many of the 
same weather problems, even if on a different scale. 
438. See UNITED STATES POWER SQUADRONS, MARINE ENGINES AND EQUIPMENT at iii 
(1972) ("An engine failure at the wrong time could well mean the 'death' of 
your boat and, more important, [the boat operator's] life may end up as a 
statistic in the. ever-increasing list of small boat casualties."). 
439. See Reliance Ins. Co., 1997 WL 714900 at *2. But see Karshan, 785 F. Supp. at 
365 (observing that the purchase of a $480,000 yacht by a sophisticated buyer 
does not transform the relationship from consumer to commercial); Alloway 
v. General Maritime Indus., 695 A.2d 264, 276 (NJ. 1997) (Handler, J., con-
curring) ("The consumer here is a purchaser of an expensive luxury whose 
bargaining power is substantially equivalent to that of the seller."). 
440. Cf. Alloway, 695 A.2d at 272-75 (explainIng that the remedy for economic loss 
should lie in warranty because a "tort cause of action for economic loss dupli-
cating the one provided by the U.C.C. is superfluous and counterproduc-
tive"). 
441. See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role of American Tort Law, 38 
ARIz. L. REv. 917, 942 (1996) ("While at the state level products liability law-at 
least until recently-has primarily been judicial law, at the federal level prod-
ucts liability law would presumably be law adopted by Congress."); see also Ste-
phen J. Werber, The Constitutional Dimensirm of a National Products Liability of 
Repose, 40 VILL. L. REv. 985, 1003 (1995) ("Congress can act in the area of 
products liability and can preempt state law."); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
id. art. I, § 8, d. 3. Congress has considered and passed legislation dealing 
with a number of federal products liability issues. See Werber, supra, at 1003. 
Additionally, federal regulatory agencies have promulgated many product 
safety standards. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Com-
pliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1214-17 (1996) (observing that 
"[p]roducts liability is a mixture of state tort law and federal regulation") (cit-
ing Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1989». 
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emption442 or by enabling legislation for federal regulatory action,443 
not the courts. 
This may be especially necessary in light of the recent calls for 
recreational-vessel propeller guards444 and the ever-increasing impor-
tance of marine design defect and failure to warn cases to admiralty 
law.445 Considering the strength of consumer pressure and the 
power of recreational boating's user associations,446 the time may be 
442. See Ausness, supra note 441, at 1266 (suggesting that one solution is for "Con-
gress or federal administrative agencies [to] preempt state products liability 
law explicitly"). 
443. See id. 
444. See Propeller Accidents Involving Houseboats and Other Displacement Type 
Recreational Vessels, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,191 (May 11, 1995) (to be codified at 33 
C.F.R. § 183) (seeking comments to determine what action may be necessary 
to address propeller accidents involving houseboats and other displacement-
type recreational vessels). In a study to develop the background to support a 
federal regulation that would require propeller guards on houseboats, it was 
found that: 
Over 31,000 boating accidents were reported to the Coast Guard for 
the years 1989 to 1993. The BAR [Boating Accident Report] data 
base indicates that 17 'Struck By Boat or Propeller' accidents involv-
ing houseboats were reported, with 16 injuries and one fatality. Three 
accidents resulting in three injuries were of the category, 'Struck by 
Boat,' and 14 were of the category, 'Struck by Propeller,' and n:-
suited in 13 injuries and one fatality. 
Id. The United States Coast Guard maintains that "[c]urrently availabl~ data 
does not support a need for Federal regulations to require propeller guards 
on houseboats." Id. After extending the comment period, the Coast Guard re-
ceived 1,994 responses to this notice seeking comments. See Propeller Injury 
Prevention Aboard Rental Boats, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,123 (1996) (to be codified at 
33 C.F.R. § 183). More than 1,800 of the comments received "were form let-
ters from individuals who support the development of regulations to require 
the use of propeller guard technology or pump jet propulsion on vessels used 
in the rental houseboat industry." Id. at 13,124. The Coast Guard further 
noted that 
Id. 
[a]n additional 69 comments supporting the development of regula-
tions to prevent the incidence of propeller-strike accidents were re-
ceived from accident victims and their relatives, attorneys, physicians, 
State law enforcement agencies, manufacturers of devices designed to 
prevent propeller-strike accidents, and other individuals. Comments 
opposing regulations were received from 57 boaters, nine houseboat 
livery operators and marinas, members of 10 associations, commit-
tees, or councils, 13 boat and engine manufacturers, and [6] naval 
architects or marine consultants. 
445. See Nixon, supra note 243, at 244-56. 
446. Among the associations that advocate recreational boating safety are the Na-
1999] East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delaval 491 
ripe for a federal, statutorily-created cause of action for marine 
products liability to preempt state law and foster uniformity.447 As 
demonstrated by the contradictory results is Sherman and Reliance In-
surance Co., there is a potential for decisional inconsistency. Between 
the interests of commercial shipping (the traditional heart of admi-
ralty law) and consumer advocates, whose interests will prevail? The 
inconsistency extends even further than the issue of the availability 
of economic damages in tort. Presently, comprehensive consumer 
warranty protections for recreational vessel defects causing only eco-
nomic losses are already inherent in both federal448 and state stat-
utes.449 Yet, along with commercial vessel owners, recreational buyers 
can avail themselves of other unique admiralty protections, such as 
limitation of liability actions to avoid or limit negligence.45o By with-
tional Safe Boating Council, United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, and United 
States Power Squadrons, Inc. See Russell & Nikas, supra note 104, at 383 ("In 
response to growing concern regarding the safety of recreational vessels, rep-
resentatives of insurance trade organizations and companies, including the 
National Association of State Boating Law Administrators, the National Safety 
Council, and the National Transportation Safety Board formed the National 
Recreational Boating Safety Coalition.") (citing New Coalition Seeks to Reduce 
Recreational Boating Casualties, MARINE SAFE1Y REp., Oct. 2, 1995, at 2). The pur-
pose of the Recreational Boating Safety Coalition is to "increase public aware-
ness of boating safety problems and refine data collection of boating acci-
dents, to better identify trends and possible areas for improvement." Id. 
447. See Jeffrey White, Does Products Bill Collide with the Tenth Amendment?, TRIAL, 
Nov. 1997, at 30 & n.8 (explaining that Congress did not create a federal 
cause of action for products liability in the Product Liability Reform Act of 
1997, but noting that it has previously introduced such a federal cause of ac-
tion in other proposed and unenacted federal legislation). But see Stolz, supra 
note 436, at 719 (arguing that "the law of pleasure boating will develop faster 
and more rationally if the creative capacities of the state courts and legisla-
tures are freed of an imaginary federal concern with anything that floats on 
navigable waters"). 
448. See Boatel Indus. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 305, 550 A.2d 389, 400 (1988); see 
also 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1988) (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act). As explained 
by 16 C.F.R. § 700.1 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland con-
cluded that the appellee's boat fell under the broad reach of the Magnuson-
Moss Act. See Boate~ 77 Md. App. at 305, 550 A.2d at 400. 
449. See Boatel, 77 Md. App. at 299-305, 550 A.2d at 397-99 (discussing MD. CODE 
ANN., COMM. LAw I § 9-109(1) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw II § 13-101 
(1990 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAw II § 14-101(d) (1990 & 
Supp. 1998». Under the specific facts of this case, the court held that these 
sections were not applicable. See id. at 302-05, 550 A.2d at 398-99. 
450. See Complaint of Dillahey, 733 F. Supp. 874, 879 (D. NJ. 1990) (discussing the 
application of 46 U.S.C. App. § 183 to recreational vessels). Limitation is an 
admiralty device that allows judicial proceedings to limit liability to the after-
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holding one type of protection while extending another based on 
consumer pressures, the courts could generate decisions that are 
counterintuitive to admiralty's consistency and uniformity 
principles.451 
Until the enactment of a federal statute or a complete change 
in the course charted by the Supreme Court, the state courts, in-< 
cluding those of Maryland, must adhere to the principles and tenets 
of the substantive general maritime law. If a Maryland court could 
not provide an admiralty based remedy for economic losses, but the 
state law would, the Maryland courts should not be tempted to do 
so. With its long and distinguished history of admiralty practice in 
its courts,452 Maryland should not depart from the traditional no-
tions of uniformity and consistency in admiralty in favor of a con-
sumerist's view. 
Imagine if you will, a hypothetical case that stems from the to-
tal loss of a yacht, similar to the circumstances in Sherman.453 As-
sume these facts: (1) there was no personal injury and minimal 
"other property" losses sustained in the boat's sinking, (2) the rec-
reational vessel was valued at less than the federal jurisdictional 
amount, and (3) it was manufactured by a Maryland corporation 
and sold by a Maryland dealer. Assume further that the suit, in 
which the plaintiffs allege that the boat was defective, was filed in 
one of Maryland's circuit courts, and the lack of any reason to ex-
tend federal jurisdiction precluded removal. Which economic loss 
principle, the harsher federal rule barring recovery absent personal 
injury or other property losses or Maryland's balancing-of-harm 
rule, should govern? 
Observing the erosion of uniformity signaled by some Supreme 
Court's454 precedent,455 as well as the Green and Sherman court's deci-
sions,456 the Maryland court could arguably allow a recovery under 
the economic loss rule fashioned by its own appellate courts.457 In 
accident value of the vessel or even exonerate the boat owner from any liabil-
ity under certain conditions. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, §§ 13-1 to 13-2 & 
761 n.8. 
451. But see Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 22 (Wash. 1993) (declin-
ing to depart from admiralty'S uniformity principles). 
452. See generally OWEN & TOLLEY. supra note 45, at 7-11. 
453. See supra Part VII.A. 
454. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 224. 
455. See supra notes 337-356, 414-23 and accompanying text. 
456. See supra notes 374. 
457. See supra Part III.C. 
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contrast, the federal scheme, whether by preemption or uniformity, 
barring a tort recovery seemingly propagates an unnecessarily severe 
result, especially in view of safety at sea concerns. Nevertheless, 
should this situation ever present itself in a Maryland state court, 
that court must look beyond the borders of its own state and the 
boundaries of its own jurisprudence to guide its result.458 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Maryland is abundantly blessed with the Chesapeake Bay and 
its seacoast. The recreational boating population attracted to its 
beauty, however, can significantly pressure Maryland's legal commu-
nity to find solutions that are seemingly more equitable to a recrea-
tional vessel consumer's economic losses when measured against the 
harsher remedies available in admiralty.459 While the commercial 
maritime vessel operator and the recreational boater-consumer are 
factually distinguishable in many aspects,460 uniformity should pre-
clude any legal distinction in a marine products liability action even 
if state law grounds are advanced.461 
The owner whose pleasure boat was lost due to failure of a de-
fective marine product may not care about uniformity principles of 
admiralty in favor of finding a remedy for the purely economic loss 
suffered.462 However, those very same admiralty principles gave rise 
to the insurance that may well have afforded protection for that 
loss.463 The legal concern lies, nonetheless, not with the choice of 
law available in a federal forum or a state court,464 but with the 
patchwork of differing law and available remedies in different juris-
dictions.465 Clearly, this offends the long tradition of uniformity in 
admiralty jurisprudence.466 
Michael R Vitt 
458. See Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 866 P.2d 15, 26 (Wash. 1993). 
459. See supra notes 311-13, 373-78 and accompanying text. 
460. See supra notes 345-52 and accompanying text. 
461. See Stanton, 866 P.2d at 26. 
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